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This Article establishes the subject of federal administrative investigations as a new
area of study in administrative law. While the literature has addressed investigations
by specific agencies and congressional investigations, there is no general account
for the trans-substantive constitutional value of administrative investigations. This
Article provides such an account by exploring the positive law, agency behaviors,
and constraints pertaining to this unresearched field. It concludes with some urgency
that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946—the statute that stands as a bill of
rights for the Administrative State—does not serve to regulate administrative
investigations and that Article III courts have held that such agency behavior is
essentially unreviewable since the mid-twentieth century. It identifies the historical
guideposts of administrative investigations and analyzes the substantial power
agencies wield when they investigate. It surveys and analyzes the limiting principles
in law that operate as nominal constraints to unlawful administrative investigative
behavior. This Article concludes by considering procedural and substantive
constraints that could be implemented to align agency investigations with
constitutional and statutory norms without sacrificing their ability to fulfill their
critical missions for the American public.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost uniformly, federal agencies investigate. Armed with broad or vague
mandates, agencies investigate matters within their purview that they might be able
to enforce or regulate. This domain is shrouded in considerable mystery. The final
agency action following an investigation does not always disclose the full extent of
the agency’s inquiry. If agencies decline to act on the results of an investigation, the
public will likely never know that it took place, aside from the targets of the
investigation or third parties who receive agency requests for information under the
threat of compulsion, such as subpoenas or warrants.
The full extent of an agency investigation can be fearsome. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) doggedly investigated a company called LabMD, which cost the
business millions to defend and ultimately caused its shuttering.1 Under the strain of
a multiyear FTC investigation, LabMD saw its revenue halved over the course of a
year and its insurers refuse to renew the company’s policies.2 In January 2014, the
CEO shut down the company due to the “psychological warfare the FTC did on the
company,” which included hammering LabMD with continual demands which
relented only upon settlement.3 Part of the cost to LabMD came from protracted
litigation spurred by allegedly falsified information that a cyber-security firm gave

1. Dune Lawrence, A Leak Wounded This Company. Fighting the Feds Finished It Off,
BLOOMBERG:
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr.
25,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-labmd-ftc-tiversa/
[https://perma.cc/ZL68WCFW].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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the government4 and allegations that a Big Law firm covered up for that firm.5 A
House Oversight Committee report later concluded that the FTC had sacrificed
“good government” in using a conflicted third party’s leads to “obtain information
validating its regulatory authority” and providing the third party with “actionable
information that it exploited for monetary gain.”6
Whether deployed nobly or not, agency investigative tools are powerful and merit
examination. This Article reveals and probes federal agency investigations, their
legal foundation and constraints, and how the People can act to improve agency
behavior. Our nuanced inquiry into administrative investigations is the first of its
kind.7 Despite the richness, ubiquity, and importance of administrative
investigations, they have never been studied in depth. Others have obliquely touched
on some of the topics that this Article squarely addresses.8 The Supreme Court has
recently addressed the scope of administrative warrants and subpoenas,9 but it has
not examined the foundation of its modern jurisprudence for evaluating the
lawfulness of agency investigations or developed a touchstone for agencies and the
public. Instead, the Court catalyzed the flourishment of a highly deferential standard
that rarely results in the quashing of agency investigative action or the exercise of
agency self-restraint. The Court has also refrained from acknowledging that the
foundations of its earlier cases have been eroded by more recent developments in
both constitutional law and administrative law.

4. Joel Schectman, Exclusive: DOJ Probes Allegations that Tiversa Lied to FTC About
Data Breaches, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2016, 8:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ustiversa-doj-probe-exclusive-idUSKCN0WK027 [https://perma.cc/4R6D-UQ6P].
5. Kathryn Rubino, Biglaw Firm Accused of Covering Up for Hacker, ABOVE L. (May
8, 2018, 11:47 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/05/biglaw-firm-accused-of-covering-upfor-hacker/ [https://perma.cc/4JR8-YJBK].
6. Lawrence, supra note 1; Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking
in 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-Security Ruling, REUTERS (June 7, 2018, 4:39 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/theres-a-big-problem-for-the-ftc-lurking-in11th-circuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKCN1J32S2 [https://perma.cc/C7Q2-3FLZ]
(describing how a cybersecurity firm exploited a LabMD technical vulnerability, and then
after LabMD refused to hire the firm, the firm reported the breach to the FTC).
7. The last article that appears to have addressed the general topic of agency
investigations was written in 1985. John W. Bagby, Administrative Investigations: Preserving
a Reasonable Balance Between Agency Powers and Target Rights, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 319
(1985). Professor Philip Hamburger has discussed “Inquisitorial Process” and “Prerogative
Orders and Warrants” through a historical lens but has not engaged on this general topic.
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 157–90 (2014); see also Mila
Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31 (2017) (on enforcement discretion); Zachary S.
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014) (same).
8. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
(2019), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Federal%20Administrative%20
Adj%20Outside%20the%20APA%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE8J-XFRS].
9. E.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166–70 (2017) (holding that a district
court’s decision to enforce or quash an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
administrative subpoena is reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo, with reference to
“longstanding practice of the courts of appeals in reviewing a district court’s decision to
enforce or quash an administrative subpoena”).
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Our research has led us to conclude that courts are not using the Fourth
Amendment to meaningfully rein in agency investigative excesses, and that courts
are not using the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) at all to regulate
agency investigative behavior. Courts have consistently held that investigative
behavior is unreviewable for lack of finality. The following chart summarizes the
interplay between the APA and various agency behaviors, as assessed by the text of
the APA. The chart displays how administrative investigations are not constrained
by positive procedures or judicial review under the APA.
Table 1. Judicially Recognized Positive APA Procedures and Article III Review of
Administrative Behaviors (all citations to title 5 of the U.S. Code)
Investigative
Behavior/Action

Informal
Adjudication
& Licensure

Formal
Adjudication
& Licensure

Subregulatory
Rulemaking

Informal
Legislative
Rulemaking

Formal
Legislative
Rulemaking

Positive
procedures?

No10

No, save for
§ 555(e)11

§§ 554, 556,
557

§ 553

§ 553

§§ 553, 556,
557

Reviewable
under
§ 704?

Rarely

Yes

Yes

Yes, generally

Yes

Yes

This Article first analyzes the evolution of the Supreme Court’s treatment of
investigative actions and concludes that the U.S. Constitution provides no
meaningful barrier to such exercises of investigative power. This Article identifies
and analyzes how the APA has never regulated the civil investigative conduct of
agencies. To aid this Article’s navigation into these uncharted waters, Part I looks
into the history of agency investigations to see whether and how they have been
constrained. Here, we fashion a working definition to use as a foundation for our
examination. Part II surveys the range of agency investigative techniques and
showcases the degree of power agencies wield when they investigate.
Part III analyzes the efficacy of checks on agency investigatory abuses. These
checks manifest in hard and soft forms. Hard constraints, like the APA and the Bill
of Rights, provide direct avenues for inappropriately investigated individuals to seek
judicial redress. Soft constraints, like the separation of powers principle of the
Constitution and Congress’s powers of oversight and the purse, merit discussion but
are less directly able to contain abusive investigations. Likewise, the exercise of
executive branch self-restraint is a suboptimal solution due to a durability deficit.
Our research leads us to conclude that there are minimal barriers applied throughout
the federal government under the innumerable administrative statutory schemes that
facilitate investigations and that any enlargement of prosecutorial behavior in light

10. The APA does not provide positive procedures for investigative acts. Unless
investigative acts qualify as final agency action in a particular case, they are not reviewable
under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 704.
11. Butte Cty. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that under 5
U.S.C. § 555(e), “the agency must provide an interested party . . . with ‘a brief statement of
the grounds for denial’” in an informal adjudication).
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of new technologies could evolve to an unanticipated and unprecedented total
enforcement environment in portions of administrative law.
To assess the desirability of heightened barriers, Part IV examines how
administrative investigations further the purpose of agencies in the constitutional
order. Proceeding from the conclusion that adequate restraints are lacking, this Part
establishes why checks are needed on investigative actions by chronicling abuses and
inefficiencies in agency investigations.
Part V identifies and analyzes potential solutions to unlawful investigative acts
that could be utilized to calibrate agency investigations into constitutional and
statutory norms without foreclosing agencies’ ability to lawfully execute their
respective missions.
I. TRACING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
A. Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Investigations
As long as there has been civilized government, there has been executive
investigation.12 The concept of administrative investigations draws from this
legacy.13 In medieval England, the King’s Chancellor, an administrative official,
commonly issued writs as royal commands.14 During the seventeenth century, the
powerful Star Chamber issued broad warrants permitting searches of the papers of
political suspects.15 Eighteenth-century England exercised administrative power in
the form of writs of assistance, that is, general search warrants (e.g., authorizing
customs searches).16 In colonial America, writs of assistance were a major grievance
that spurred the colonies to declare independence.17
Some of the first American statutes explicitly authorizing agency investigations
were the Act of 1838, which created the Steamboat Inspection Service,18 and the

12. 1 Samuel 14:38 (“Saul said, ‘Draw near here, all you chiefs of the people, and
investigate and see how this sin has happened today.’”).
13. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE L.J. 1111,
1111–14 (1947) (beginning in biblical times and continuing through World War II and noting
that “[t]he story of the development of the administrative power of investigation is rather
dramatic”).
14. John A. Hamill, Sr., EPA Administrative Investigative Tools: An Inside Perspective,
4 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 85, 86–87 (1989) (discussing how writs were “an executive, not a
judicial, invention” arising after the Norman conquest of 1066 and commonly issued by the
King’s Chancellor and other administrative officials).
15. Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362
(1921).
16. Philip Hamburger, Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response to Paul
Craig, 81 MO. L. REV. 939, 952 (2016).
17. Davis, supra note 13, at 1111–14.
18. Act of July 7, 1838, Pub. L. No. 25-191, 5 Stat. 304 (providing for the better security
of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam). This act
provided for inspections of hulls, boilers, and the like. Id. §§ 3–6; see Jerry L. Mashaw,
Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 18291861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1633 (2008).
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Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887.19 The courts struggled with what
oversight to exercise over agency investigations.20 The Supreme Court initially
viewed agencies’ ability to issue subpoenas with skepticism, even upon
congressional delegations.21 The majority opinion in Harriman v. Interstate
Commerce Commission limited administrative subpoenas to the “cases where the
sacrifice of privacy is necessary—those where the investigations concern a specific
breach of the law.”22 The Court reinforced the notion that agency investigative acts
would be scrutinized carefully by denouncing a “general, roving, offensive,
inquisitorial, compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission without any
allegations, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or of evidence,
and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice.”23 Into the 1920s, the Court
reiterated its disapproval of “fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility
that they may disclose evidence of crime.”24
But the Supreme Court’s attitude shifted after the New Deal established new and
varied agencies with complex missions.25 After World War II, and in nearcontemporaneity with the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,
the Court decided a body of cases that recalibrated the baseline judicial scrutiny of
agency investigations to highly deferential. These seminal cases include Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling26 and United States v. Morton Salt Co.27
In Oklahoma Press Publishing, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division issued subpoenas to two newspaper publishers it was investigating for
violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.28 The publishers resisted the subpoenas,
arguing that the Division failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment and
demonstrate the probable cause necessary to enforce the subpoenas.29 The Supreme
Court rejected that argument and dismissed the publishers’ concerns about executive
“general fishing expeditions into [their] books, records and papers, in order to secure
evidence that they have violated the Act,” holding that “the records in these cases
present no question of actual search and seizure” but were only “constructive”
searches.30 For such constructive searches, the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause

19. KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.1,
at 940 (6th ed. 2019) (citing 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887) (repealed 1978)).
20. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343,
1401–08 (2014); Donald R.C. Pongrace, Requirement of Notice of Third-Party Subpoenas
Issued in SEC Investigations: A New Limitation on the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33
AM. U. L. REV. 701, 709–16 (1984) (discussing how the Supreme Court initially erected a high
hurdle for agencies to issue administrative subpoenas); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19
(similar).
21. Pongrace, supra note 20, at 709–10.
22. 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908).
23. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936) (quoting In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 263
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)).
24. FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
25. Davis, supra note 13, at 1122.
26. 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
27. 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
28. Okla. Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 189.
29. Id. at 189–90.
30. Id. at 194–95, 202–05.
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requirement was satisfied simply “by the court’s determination that the investigation
is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents
sought are relevant to the inquiry.”31 Oklahoma Press Publishing thus ruled that the
Fourth Amendment protects regulated parties only so far as Congress has explicitly
limited agencies’ subpoena authorities.32 Because the Fair Labor Standards Act’s
“language leaves no room to doubt that Congress intended to authorize just what the
Administrator did and sought to have the courts do,” the publishers’ claims failed.33
The opinion also took particular note of the “corporate character” of the publishers’
records, implying that the Fourth Amendment’s protections were especially
attenuated in that circumstance.34 Justice Murphy dissented alone, inveighing against
all uses of administrative subpoenas and alluding to King George III as he worried
that administrative subpoenas were vulnerable to “[e]xcessive use or abuse of
authority.”35
The Supreme Court returned to review the lawfulness of agency warrants four
years later in Morton Salt, this time in a challenge to an FTC order requiring salt
producers and trade associations to file various and comprehensive reports and
statements.36 The salters argued that the Commission’s order violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.37 Building off of Oklahoma Press Publishing, including its dim
view of the robustness of business associations’ constitutional rights in this context,
the Court held that “neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead
an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.”38 “Of course,” the Court
recognized, the Constitution imposes some limits on what the Commission could
demand.39 In addition to the limitations found in Oklahoma Press Publishing—that
the type of agency request must be authorized by statute and the specific agency
request must be “reasonably relevant”—the Supreme Court held that “the demand
[must be] not too indefinite.”40 The Court summarily found that the Commission’s
order, on its face, met those standards.41 Finally, the Court faulted the salters for not
complaining directly to the Commission and asking it to modify the order: before
quashing agency investigative acts as “arbitrarily excessive,” courts “may expect the
supplicant to have made reasonable efforts before the Commission itself to obtain
reasonable conditions.”42
These two decisions had the effect of “further legitimizing the routine use of
administrative subpoenas.”43 This regime was ushered in by new Justices with a more

31. Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 197–202.
33. Id. at 198 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 204–08.
35. Id. at 218–19 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
36. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 636–37 (1950) (first citing Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); and then United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
37. Id. at 651.
38. Id. at 652.
39. Id. at 652–53.
40. Id. at 652.
41. Id. at 653.
42. Id.
43. Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 1404 (footnote omitted).
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hospitable view of government intervention.44 The Supreme Court has not in recent
years squarely addressed this issue or the standards that should apply to judicial
review of agency investigatory techniques.45 Although the Supreme Court has not in
recent years taken up the matter squarely, it has not done so for a lack of petitions
for writs of certiorari. Several have been filed in the decades since Morton Salt,
asking the Court to overrule or diminish parts of that jurisprudence.46
B. Defining Agency Investigative Acts
The postwar Supreme Court cases involve perhaps the quintessential agency
investigative act: subpoenas. But subpoenas are just one example of an agency
investigative act. A proper study of investigations requires us to precisely define
agency investigative acts. The academy and courts have not coalesced on a
comprehensive definition of an agency investigative act. The Attorney General’s
1941 report on administrative procedure remarked, “Much that occurs at a hearing
or conference is conditioned by the investigation of the problem which may have
preceded it, or of which the hearing may be a part.”47 Once Congress enacted the
APA, which carried forward many existing administrative law practices, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis offered, “The Administrative Procedure Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, administrative proceedings are not limited to rule-making,
adjudication, and licensing. Some administrative proceedings are investigations—
proceedings designed to produce information.”48
The Supreme Court has weighed in by providing a negative definition of an
administrative investigation, concluding that an investigation is not a final agency
action.49 An investigation “is not a definitive statement of position . . . [but only]
represents a threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted.”50 The APA
obliquely references “nonpublic investigatory proceeding[s]” and “investigative
act[s],”51 but “provides no statutory definition or classification of different kinds of
investigations.”52
Nor do dictionaries provide helpful definitions. Merriam-Webster defines
“investigate” and the word’s derivatives—“investigatory,” “investigator,” and
“investigation”—to mean or involve “a systematic examination.”53 Other courts have

44. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19.
45. See, e.g., id. § 8.2.
46. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Koresko v. Chao, 549 U.S. 942 (2006)
(No. 05-1501) 2006 WL 1455400 (“Morton Salt and Powell are decades old, predating this
Court’s jurisprudence on privacy rights. Subsequent statutory law has worn away the main
thread of the holdings – that government inquiries must be presumed legitimate.”).
47. ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 111 (1941).
48. Davis, supra note 13, at 1111; see also David C. Shonka, Responding to the
Government’s Civil Investigations, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 1 (2014).
49. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 241 (1980).
50. Id.
51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(c), 554(d).
52. Hamill, supra note 14, at 88.
53. Investigate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020).
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turned to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition, which focuses on the objective of the
investigation: “[t]he activity of trying to find out the truth about something.”54 The
Department of Justice has defined “regulatory investigations” similarly:
“‘[R]egulatory investigations’ . . . generally have as their objective regulatory
compliance by private parties.”55 This demonstrates a parallel framework to Justice
Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” approach.56
Although there is no general executive branch definition of administrative
investigation, certain organic statutes give agencies binding definitions in some
contexts. For example, the Antitrust Civil Process Act defines an “antitrust
investigation” as “any inquiry conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose
of ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in any antitrust violation
or in any activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, joint venture, or similar
transaction, which, if consummated, may result in an antitrust violation.”57 Similar
statutory definitions for civil administrative investigation exist for the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)58 and the FTC.59 These definitions, too, are only
general.
We thus offer a definition of agency investigative acts: executive branch agency
exercises of civil examination or inquiry authority, taken in the absence of positive
APA procedures, that carry the perceived, eventual, or actual threat of compulsion.60
We draw the term from the APA, which uses it, albeit glancingly and without
definition.61
Deconstructing this definition requires mapping agency behavior that precedes
“agency action” as normatively understood in the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 704.62 The
agency must be acting on some kind of formal or informal complaint, tip, internal
targeting, or defined trigger point, at which point the agency researches the facts
necessary to sustain an agency action and decides whether to initiate such an action.63

54. MusclePharm Corp. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 712 F. App’x 745, 755 (10th
Cir. 2017) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)) (distinguishing “regulatory
investigation” from “proceeding”).
55. Inspector General Authority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 Op. O.L.C. 54,
54 n.1 (1989).
56. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (applying such
an approach to pornography).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 5561. The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for the CFPB’s
director to be removed only for cause. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct.
2183 (2020). Although the case focused primarily on the authorities of inferior officers of the
United States, it arose in the context of CFPB attempting to enforce its civil investigatory
authority against the respondent. Id. at 2188.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1.
60. This definition comports with the only other attempted definition in the literature of
which we are aware, Professor Davis’s comment that investigations are “designed to produce
information.” Davis, supra note 13, at 1111.
61. 5 U.S.C. § 555(c).
62. ASIMOW, supra note 8.
63. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(a) (describing the procedure for the Department of Agriculture
to investigate, hear, and fine packers and swine contractors who have violated or may have
violated the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921).
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If the type of agency action is an adjudication, then the investigation could enable
the decision whether to adjudicate by enforcement against a specific party. Here,
investigation targets are not (yet) respondents or defendants in agency or civil
actions, but akin to third-party witnesses, including third-party witnesses on notice
of their potential status as a party-defendant.64 The goal is to determine whether
agency action that would trigger normative section 704 finality is warranted.
Our definition presumes that the purpose of agency investigation is to see whether
some agency action may eventually be warranted, excepting when the investigation
is preordained to produce a discrete outcome. This comports with the Supreme
Court’s 1946 statement that agency investigations aim to “discover and procure
evidence” with the ultimate goal being to see if that evidence “should justify”
bringing a charge or complaint.65 It also comports with the Court’s later distinction
between “determinations of a quasi-judicial nature”—i.e., adjudications—and
“nonadjudicative, fact-finding investigations.”66 This definitional prong leaves out
agency movement where agency action is remote, impossible, or forsworn. For
example, when the government seeks demographic data for the decennial census, the
request’s purpose is not to make agency action.67
A variety of sources can spark an investigation. Some agencies could conduct
investigations as an exercise of their own discretion and on their own initiative. For
example, the CFPB may issue civil investigative demands to collect information
“before the institution of any proceedings.”68 The agency might do so simply upon
reading a news story,69 or “merely on suspicion.”70 The agency might receive a tip
or notification, perhaps from an inspector general or another federal agency like the
Department of Justice.71 This may be because a private party files a charge with the
agency, which is then required to investigate (often within a time frame) and decide
whether to file an administrative complaint.72 The agency may commence an

64. FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1310–11 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
65. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201 (1946).
66. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 445–46 (1960).
67. See 13 U.S.C. §§ 141, 181 (authorizing the Census Bureau to conduct decennial
censuses and interim inquiries).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1). Each demand must “state the nature of the conduct
constituting the alleged violation which is under investigation and the provision of law
applicable to such violation.” Id. § 5562(c)(2).
69. Shonka, supra note 48, at 2.
70. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).
71. E.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS ON
THE
FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 8–9 (2012), https://transition.fec.gov/em/
respondent_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGT4-JK65].
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(d)(2) (the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division’s
Immigrant and Employee Rights Section, which receives and investigates complaints of unfair
immigration-related employment practices); see also id. § 1324b(d)(1) (also permitting that
Section to unilaterally investigate and file charges); 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(g)–(i) (similar, for
Federal Aviation Administration complaints); 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) (similar, for FEC
complaints); 11 C.F.R. § 111.4 (same); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (similar, for National Labor
Relations Board complaints).
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investigation upon direction from the President.73 Congress may also issue a directive
to investigate,74 for example, through a statute directing an agency to adopt rules
within a certain number of days on a particular subject, which requires the agency to
investigate what the rule should be.75
Some agencies, like the Internal Revenue Service76 and the Federal Election
Commission,77 exercise express discretion under their organic statute, commonly in
the form of compliance checks or audits. Such an investigation may arise out of a
telephone call received on a tip line, a whistleblower complaint, or some other reason
for the agency to suspect a violation. But even if the agency does not have a discrete
reason to audit a party, it may employ a random audit78 to decrease the probability
that violators can strategically evade enforcement.79 The audit might not be
completely random. An agency might pay attention to particular industries or fields
within its regulatory purview.80
Once the agency elects to investigate, there are a number of possible outcomes,
all of which (under our definition) carry the perceived threat or actual consequence
of compulsion. The agency may decide to commence an adjudication or rulemaking,
although the adjudication may be the agency finding a liability yet declining to seek
an immediate remedy.81 Conversely, the agency might decline to commence an
adjudication or rulemaking for the time being. An outcome from an agency
investigation that yields an agency action could be a compliance action. For example,
a grant-distributing agency must comply with its organic statute and the Office of
Management and Budget’s various circulars via audits for compliance purposes.
Sometimes, there is the authority to engage in an audit outside the periodic time
requirement in response to allegations or suspicion of fraud or bad action.
An adjudication or rulemaking does not necessarily need to be the goal, however.
An agency could investigate for the purpose of discovering and logging “informal
enforcement actions.” For example, the EPA maintains Enforcement and
Compliance History Online, which is a searchable, publicly accessible database that

73. E.g., Zeke Miller, President Trump Is Escalating Efforts to Investigate Intelligence
Agencies, TIME (May 24, 2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20190524024835/
http:/time.com/5595248/donald-trump-intelligence-russia/ [https://perma.cc/GUN3-3AXW];
Kaveh Waddell, Obama Orders Investigation into Election-Related Hacking, ATLANTIC (Dec.
9,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/obama-orders-fullreview-of-election-related-hacking/510149/ [https://perma.cc/NH6R-QKDX].
74. Shonka, supra note 48, at 2.
75. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056c(a); 22 U.S.C. § 5504(a); 25 U.S.C. § 1406(b), (c).
76. Audit
Techniques
Guides
(ATGs),
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/audit-techniques-guides-atgs
[https://perma.cc/UV9A-R5KE] (industry-specific audit guidances).
77. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9007(a), 9008(g), 9038(a).
78. See Chaves Cnty. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
79. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,
Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 299 (2006).
80. See Audit Techniques Guides, supra note 76.
81. See, e.g., Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab., 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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lists corporate violations and provides data on “informal enforcement actions.”82 An
agency investigation might also result in management audits, where agencies work
with regulated parties to ensure that regulated parties are prepared to follow the law.
Of course, to fall within our definition of “agency investigation,” the interaction
between the agency and the regulated parties must at some point carry, at minimum,
the perceived threat of coercion.
So, what is not an agency civil investigation? Negative definitions are helpful
because the APA does not precisely or exhaustively define all forms of agency
conduct or behavior. Indeed, the APA is replete with negative definitions.83 The APA
also hints at investigative functions without defining, positively or negatively, that
term.84 Some courts have implied—appropriately so, in our view—that investigative
acts are categorically distinct from other types of “agency action,” including
adjudications or rulemaking.85
Proceedings with positive APA procedures like rulemaking or adjudications are
not agency investigations; our definition does not include everything leading up to,
or just short of, the completion of rulemakings or adjudications. For instance, we
define agency investigations to exclude predecisional adjudicational and rulemaking
processes where the decision to charge a party has been formally made and an
impartial decisionmaker now has jurisdiction over the case.86 Although a neutral
agency decisionmaker conducting hearings as part of the formal adjudication process
is literally “investigating” a claim and assessing whether the complaint has merit, we
exclude these types of proceedings because the agency is acting in a quasi-judicial
role. Such proceedings feature fewer problems, as we discuss below in Part V, and
objections to agency abuses committed during the adjudicatory or rulemaking
process can often be raised to an impartial decisionmaker. Our definition thus
requires that there be a lack of APA positive procedures, and therefore the processes
of rulemaking and adjudication are not “investigations.”87

82. Enforcement and Compliance History Online, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://echo.epa.gov/ [https://perma.cc/42Q5-53MT]. For an example page, see Detailed
Facility Report, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://echo.epa.gov/detailed-facilityreport?fid=110070032218 [https://perma.cc/LF6D-F4C4].
83. The APA has a negative definition of informal adjudication as adjudication that is not
formal. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a); see also SecurityPoint Holdings, Inc. v. Transp. Sec. Admin.,
769 F.3d 1184, 1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying § 555(e) to informal adjudications).
Similarly, “agency” is a general definition with a number of negative carveouts. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(1).
84. See, e.g., § 554(d).
85. United States v. W.H. Hodges & Co., 533 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
see Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 366 n.25 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g, 228 F.3d 559
(5th Cir. 2000) (dicta).
86. We have also structured our definition to exclude “enforcement actions.” For
example, in the SEC context, enforcement actions mean all the legal proceedings that the
commission brings that would normatively be considered “final agency action” under the
APA. Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 903–04 (2016).
87. This is because the APA provides the general contours of process for rulemaking and
adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557.

2022]

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

433

An agency investigation could result in collateral issues during and following
agency action. Instead of the agency deciding whom to pursue or whether to pursue
someone, the agency could be deciding the size of a penalty. For example, the Office
of Thrift Supervision may assess civil fines against a party that violates banking laws
or regulations or breaches a fiduciary duty. In assessing fines, the agency, by statute,
must consider mitigating factors like the size of the subpoenaed party’s financial
resources.88
Further, our affirmative definition covers only civil agency investigations.
Criminal investigations by agencies are a separate inquiry beyond the scope of this
Article.89 Additional constitutional safeguards apply if the investigation is for a
criminal offense, including if a civil investigation shifts into a criminal
investigation.90 That said, criminal investigations are often intertwined with civil
investigations and are frequently the outgrowth of an investigation that may have
begun with a purely civil aim.
Our definition excludes noncoercive action.91 While an agency investigation can
be noncoercive or nonintrusive, this Article concerns only coercive or intrusive
actions—or actions carrying the threat of possible future coercion or the perception
of coercion—such that the respondent would want to challenge them. Purely
voluntary requests, such as civil extradition mutual legal assistance treaty
information requests from foreign countries or Hague Convention requests for
evidence, implicate fewer of the concerns we identify later on and also permit a
brighter line by their exclusion. We do recognize that at some point, a significant
investment in noncoercive factfinding can morph into an investigation. The line can
be subtle and can vary among and within agencies.
Finally, our definition of “investigative act” excludes investigations by entities
that are not “agencies.” To make that determination, we look to the familiar APA
definition of an “agency,” which carves out Congress, the courts, state and territorial
governmental entities, and so forth.92 Thus, this Article does not examine

88. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2); In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1416
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
89. Criminal investigations merit a separate investigation but are typically associated with
federal employees classified under the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s Series GS1811. See U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., JOB FAMILY POSITION CLASSIFICATION STANDARD FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE WORK IN THE INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE
GROUP, 1800 12–14 (2011), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classificationqualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/standards/1800/1800a.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/PQ2Y-C637]. Employees classified as 1811 investigators “supervise, lead, or
perform work involving planning, conducting, or managing investigations related to alleged
or suspected criminal violations of Federal laws.” U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT., HANDBOOK OF
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND FAMILIES 109 (Dec. 2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-dataoversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/
occupationalhandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYV2-AMGW].
90. See generally Risa Berkower, Note, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use
of Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251 (2005).
91. Cf., e.g., United States v. Bailey (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F.3d 341, 348
(4th Cir. 2000) (noting that administrative subpoenas “commence[] an adversary process”).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
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investigations by Article I actors or Article III courts.93 We also exclude certain
entities from the APA definition that courts have construed as non-agencies, such as
presidential czars within the Executive Office of the President.
In sum, an investigative act lies early on the spectrum of total agency behavior.
Agency activity progresses from a triggering event to an investigation, then to the
beginning of an “agency action.” If the action is adjudication, then the investigation
ends with the allegation of a legal violation. If the action is rulemaking, then the
investigation ends with the commencement of a rulemaking process.
II. AGENCY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS
Before understanding agency investigation norms and the appropriate legal
response to agency investigations, it is necessary to understand precisely how
agencies accomplish their investigations. First, agencies can often issue subpoenas
to inspect documents and other physical materials.94 Some agencies issue national
security letters95 or “civil investigative demand[s]”96 on responding parties.97 Other
organic statutes endow agencies with the authority to conduct audits, by which the
government gains documents or information.98 Congress has not given any agency
the power to enforce such orders with contempt powers, although some state courts
have permitted state agencies to punish disobedience with contempt.99

93. For an example of a judicial investigation, see Matt Zapotosky, Judiciary Closes
Investigation of Sexual Misconduct Allegations Against Retired Judge Alex Kozinski, WASH.
POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judiciarycloses-investigation-of-sexual-misconduct-allegations-against-retired-judge-alex-kozinski/
2018/02/05/e3a94bb8-0ac0-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/W5TXTAXE].
94. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.13 n.4 (5th ed. 2012) (listing examples); see also, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 499m
(Department of Agriculture); 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (Department of Justice Antitrust Division); 18
U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B), (C) (Attorney General may inspect the records of certain licensed
firearm importers, manufacturers, and dealers); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5123(a) (IRS), § 7609 (IRS thirdparty summonses); 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Secretary of Labor); 49 U.S.C. § 32910(a)(1)(A)
(Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency);
52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Attorney General may inspect and copy certain records related to federal
elections); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (D. Wyo.
1983); U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. LEGAL POL’Y, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES
(2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#4 [https://perma.cc/SR7CJ93W].
95. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709, 3511; Doe v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1301 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
in chambers).
96. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854
F.3d 683, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
97. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1379–80 (2015) (tracing
a since-rejected view of Justice Field that agencies should conduct investigations without the
aid of federal courts, and thus without the aid of the judiciary’s subpoena power).
98. Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 252–58, 276–82.
99. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.2.
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Second, many agencies can inspect property or enter premises, sometimes for the
purpose of inspecting records.100 The organic statute does not need to explicitly
authorize searches, as courts sometimes infer an agency’s ability to search.101
Third, agencies may make voluntary requests for interviews or documents.102
Agencies can issue such requests to third parties, perhaps before the subject of the
investigation learns that it is under investigation. In doing so, agencies can liaise with
state and local agencies.103 Of course, if these requests do not carry the perceived,
eventual, or actual threat of compulsion for the party under investigation, then they
lie outside our definition of investigative action.
Finally, an agency may engage in noncoercive monitoring practices. These
include checking databases, public or private;104 maintaining interagency lines of
communication;105 setting up a tip line;106 conducting laboratory work, as with the
Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology;107 and
even reading the mail from the public such as an IRS Form 13909 Tax-Exempt
Organization Complaint (Referral).108 Some sources of information at an agency’s
disposal are tips, inspector general findings, periodic reports from grantees, audits,
charges, and complaints that it may receive at little to no cost.109 Passive practices
require something more than merely watching the news or parsing the internet.110
Such monitoring practices, though facially noncoercive, can carry coercive
tendencies if coupled with a subjectively inferred threat of firmer action.

100. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2065(a) (FTC); 26 U.S.C. § 5123(b) (IRS); 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a)
(Department of the Interior); 42 U.S.C. § 7542(b)(2) (Environmental Protection Agency); 49
U.S.C. § 60120(a)(2) (Secretary of Transportation may request the Attorney General bring a
civil action to allow for on-site inspections to enforce 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101–41, regarding
pipeline safety).
101. E.g., Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986).
102. See, e.g., Kerry Flynn, Why the FBI Is Investigating Media Buying Practices, DIGIDAY
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://digiday.com/marketing/fbi-investigating-media-buying-practices/
[https://perma.cc/G88P-6VTC].
103. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 211(b) (authorizing the Department of Labor to use the services of
state and local labor agencies with consent); see also 27 U.S.C. § 202(f) (authorizing the
Department of Treasury to work with “any department or other agency of the Government” to
enforce the Federal Alcohol Administration Act).
104. See, e.g., Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Case Development and Limited Review
Investigations, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/ouractivities/enforcement/oe-manual/case-development-and-limited-review-investigations
[https://perma.cc/X3FJ-4RHR].
105. See, e.g., id.
106. E.g., ICE Tip Form, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.ice.gov/webform/hsi-tip-form [https://perma.cc/GUP4-UA5X].
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 271–281a; see Davis, supra note 13, at 1114.
108. Form 13909, Internal Revenue Serv. (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f13909.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9J4-EX58].
109. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
110. See Davis, supra note 13, at 1114. For more information on how agencies use internet
evidence in their adjudications, see Independent Research by Agency Adjudicators in the
Internet Age, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.acus.gov/researchprojects/internet-evidence-agency-adjudication [https://perma.cc/T8T4-QV2K].
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Congress must authorize an agency, at least implicitly, to use these tools.111 The
APA contemplates agencies having such power and provides an agency with power
to make “[p]rocess, requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or
demand,” including a subpoena if “authorized by law.”112 However, the APA does
not independently empower agencies to issue subpoenas or inspect property.113
Rather, the primary source of an agency’s investigative authority is its organic
statutes.114 By one count, “Congress has passed more than 300 administrative
subpoena statutes ‘grant[ing] some form of administrative subpoena authority to
most federal agencies.’”115 But creating some tension with that fundament, the
Supreme Court held in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States that “[r]egulatory or
enforcement authority generally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and
investigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted.”116
Dow Chemical does not require an agency endowed with investigatory or
enforcement authority “to identify explicitly each and every technique that may be
used in the course of executing the statutory mission.”117 Courts have used this
language—sometimes alongside an organic statute’s legislative history118—to permit
certain modes of investigatory inspection or searches that are not specifically
authorized by statute.119
Expansive readings of this sort are sometimes necessary, as organic statutes often
impose no textual constraints on the investigative techniques agencies may use. For
example, Congress has permitted the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division Administrator to broadly “investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or

111. As part of its oversight powers, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, Congress can initiate and
undertake its own investigations through subpoenas, similar to agency investigative acts.
Daniel Epstein, “Drive-by” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight in Court, 2020 PEPP. L.
REV. 37, 41.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), (d).
113. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 67 (1947)
(“It should be emphasized that [this] relates only to existing subpoena powers conferred upon
agencies; it does not grant power to issue subpoenas to agencies which are not so empowered
by other statutes.”); United States v. Sec. State Bank & Tr., 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973).
114. Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 3 BASIL J. MEZINES,
JACOB A. STEIN & JULES GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 20.02 (1988)); Univ. of Richmond v.
Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 332 (E.D. Va. 1982) (“[N]o inherent investigatory authority exists in
a government agency but only such authority as is granted by statute.”); Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(“An administrative agency’s authority to issue subpoenas ‘is created solely by statute.’”).
115. Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 103, 117 (2012) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted); see Subpoena
Authority,
ADMIN.
CONF.
OF
THE
U.S.
&
STAN.
L.
SCH.,
https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/subpoena [https://perma.cc/LFE9-ZMEY].
116. 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Boliden Metech, Inc. v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 77, 81 (D.R.I. 1988)
(citing Toxic Substances Control Act, S. REP. NO. 94-3149 (1976) (Conf. Rep.)).
119. Nat’l-Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
background sampling, although not specified in statute, was permissible under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6927(a)).
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matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person
has violated any provision of this chapter, or which may aid in the enforcement of
the provisions of this chapter.”120 Similar expansive authority is held by the Office
of Foreign Asset Control,121 the Drug Enforcement Administration,122 and the U.S.
Postal Service.123 These textually broad delegations of investigatory authority
provide little constraint to agencies’ exercise of discretion in utilizing investigatory
tools.
III. CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS
There are several legal levers that check overzealous exercises of agency
investigative authority with varying degrees of success. They include tools under the
U.S. Constitution, the APA, and other applicable statutes and regulations. These legal
levers tend to sort into a binary hard-versus-soft paradigm. “Hard” checks are
constraints on investigative acts that can be applied more directly by parties
aggrieved by investigative acts, such as Fourth Amendment challenges to the
relevancy of an agency investigative act. “Soft” checks are constraints that include
the articles of the U.S. Constitution embodying the doctrine of the separation of
powers, congressional oversight, public pressure, executive or agency selfconstraint, and agency culture.
A. Constitutional Constraints
1. Constitutional Civil Liberties
The Founders did not contemplate the modern administrative state and the
complex civil society that it regulates.124 The administrative state, which has grown
rapidly since the New Deal era, “has seemingly become an irresistible force” that
“has collided with what at first were apparently immovable constitutional principles
concerning privacy, searches and seizures, self-incrimination, and freedom from
bureaucratic snooping.”125 In the wake of that era, courts have held repeatedly that
the Constitution permits an agency to exercise investigative functions.126
Nevertheless, the Constitution’s protections of civil liberties can limit meandering
agency investigations. The primary guarantee of personal rights against improper

120. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (Fair Labor Standards Act); id. § 2616(a) (same for Family and
Medical Leave).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)–(2).
122. 21 U.S.C. §§ 880, 965; see 21 C.F.R. § 1316.03 (2021).
123. 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(6); see 39 C.F.R. § 233.1 (2021).
124. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1233 (1994).
125. Davis, supra note 13, at 1111.
126. See, e.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (collecting cases); McVane v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re McVane), 44 F.3d
1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Courts have imposed few constitutional limitations on agencies’
power to issue administrative subpoenas.”).
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investigations is the Fourth Amendment.127 The Supreme Court has not interpreted
these protections to be robust in the civil setting.128 Generally, the agency’s power of
access “is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or
controversy for power to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that
the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.”129
The Fourth Amendment interacts differently with certain types of agency
investigatory tools. Starting with subpoenas, an agency subpoena—including those
requiring appearance at a deposition130—effectuates a “constructive search” by the
agency.131 The Fourth Amendment erects a number of hurdles on such subpoenas,
albeit of varying heights. In the modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudential
landscape, as first enunciated in Morton Salt and Oklahoma Press Publishing,132 a
party may launch a “strictly limited” challenge to an agency’s subpoena in
enforcement proceedings.133 The moving party must demonstrate that the agency has
failed any of four showings that favor the agency. The following chart summarizes
the dimensions of these standards.

127. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
128. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950).
129. Id.
130. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (2021) (FTC permits depositions); Amendments to the
Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 201) (SEC proposing to allow depositions).
131. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202 (1946); cf. McLane Co. v. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2017) (appearing to distance subpoenaquashing jurisprudence from the Fourth Amendment by stating that Oklahoma Press “implied
that the Fourth Amendment is the source of the requirement that a subpoena not be ‘too
indefinite’” (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950))).
132. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209; see also
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989) (enforcing this requirement in a more modern
case).
133. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 871–72 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Univ. of Med. &
Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir. 2003); accord Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 310–11 (7th Cir. 1981) (calling
administrative subpoena enforcement proceedings “of a summary nature not requiring the
issuance of process, hearing, findings of fact, and the elaborate process of a civil suit” (quoting
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 122 F.2d 450, 451 (6th Cir. 1941))).
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Table 2. Fourth Amendment Showings Necessary to Challenge Pre-Adjudication
Civil Investigatory Agency Subpoenas
Standard
Is the subpoena in the agency’s
authority?

•
•
•
•

Is the subpoena “reasonably
relevant”?

•
•
•
•

Is the subpoena overbroad or
improper in scope?

•
•
•

Is the subpoena unduly burdensome?

•

Requirements on Agency
Must be within authority134
Cannot “plainly lack jurisdiction”135
Cannot investigate “other wrongdoing, as yet
unknown”136
Must comply with all procedural requirements in
its organic statute and with its own regulations137
Cannot be issued for improper purpose138
Cannot be issued in bad faith139
Agency’s own appraisal of relevancy, which
“must be accepted so long as it is not obviously
wrong”140
May hinge on whether the target of investigation
is a person or a business association141
Cannot be “too indefinite”142
Cannot be “unreasonably broad”143
Must be “sufficiently limited in scope,”144 subject
to federal privilege law145
Cannot unduly burden the respondent146

134. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla.
Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209; see also Stuart, 489 U.S. at 359 (enforcing this requirement
in a more modern case).
135. E.g., FTC v. Ernstthal, 607 F.2d 488, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Chapa De Indian
Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003).
136. In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
137. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954).
138. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58; Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Frates, 61 F.3d 962, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
see Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d
683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
139. United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316–18 (1978); SEC v. WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v.
Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1995).
140. Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting FTC v.
Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
141. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
142. Id.; Powell, 379 U.S. at 48; Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209
(1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989) (enforcing this requirement
in a more modern case).
143. E.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Am.
Med. Response, Inc., 438 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2006).
144. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).
145. See, e.g., Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 5
F.3d 1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210–11 (D.C. Cir.
1980)) (FTC); Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 889 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (ERISA); United States
v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1977) (IRS); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d
633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962) (IRS).
146. See, 387 U.S. at 544; Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882, 882 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1977); FTC v.
Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1315–16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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First, an agency subpoena must be within the agency’s authority to issue.147 This
requirement is variously articulated as whether the agency “plainly lacks”
jurisdiction.148 That is, an agency cannot simply serve a subpoena seeking
information to investigate “other wrongdoing, as yet unknown.”149 Relatedly, an
agency must comply with all procedural requirements in its organic statute and with
its own regulations.150 For example, the statute may require the agency to state the
nature of its investigation and the law supposedly being violated.151 An agency’s
authority must extend not only to the type of investigatory tool used but also to the
type of information sought. For example, an agency holding the statutory authority
only to subpoena information for the purpose of determining liability cannot enforce
a subpoena of personal financial information for the purpose of assessing the
individual’s net worth (so as to determine the cost-effectiveness of an
investigation).152 This standard is rather lax. One circuit held that “[a]s long as the
agency’s assertion of authority is not apocryphal, a procedurally sound subpoena
must be enforced.”153 The Supreme Court has confirmed that the assertion of
authority is jurisdictional in nature and that the familiar Chevron deference154 is due
to an agency’s determination of its jurisdiction.155
Relatedly, the subpoena cannot be used for an improper purpose or in bad faith.156
“Bad faith” must be institutionalized bad faith—bad faith by individual agency actors
is insufficient.157 One example of bad faith would include “harassment of the
recipient of the subpoena, or a conscious attempt by the agency to pressure the
recipient to settle a collateral dispute.”158 However, it is worth noting that the purpose

147. See cases cited supra note 132.
148. See cases cited supra note 133.
149. See cases cited supra note 134.
150. See cases cited supra note 135.
151. E.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs.,
854 F.3d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
152. Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 947–49 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Katherine
Scherb, Comment, Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial Records: What Protection
for Privacy Does the Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1075, 1085–97
(summarizing case law). Note that the D.C. Circuit does not view this ultra vires inquiry as
being constitutional. Resol. Tr. Corp., 18 F.3d at 949.
153. United States v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 84 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 1996).
154. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
155. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 113, at 69 (first citing Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); and then citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946)) (“Nothing in the language of section 6(c) suggests any purpose to change
this established rule.”). The Attorney General’s Manual cited the fact that an earlier APA bill
specifically entitled courts to “determine all relevant questions of law raised by the parties,
including the authority or jurisdiction of the agency.” Id. (emphasis omitted). However, that
language did not make it into the enacted bill. Id. Note that the Constitution, if not the APA,
allows courts to hear certain challenges to an agency’s jurisdiction, per post-1946 case law
from the Supreme Court. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 49–51 (1938).
156. See case cited supra note 139.
157. United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314–18 (1978).
158. United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1995).
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of the subpoena in the seminal case establishing this requirement, United States v.
Powell, was important because the agency at issue, the IRS, could issue summons
only for limited purposes.159 Thus, the “improper purpose” requirement might not be
available to parties challenging every type of investigative act under every type of
organic statute.
Second, the subpoena must be “reasonably relevant.”160 This standard appears lax
too. Because the “standard for judging relevancy in an investigatory proceeding is
more relaxed than in an adjudicatory one,”161 the court “defer[s] to the agency’s
appraisal of relevancy, which ‘must be accepted so long as it is not obviously
wrong.’”162 The burden of showing irrelevance lies with the responding party.163
The relevance test may hinge on whether the target of investigation is a person or
a business association. This distinction derives from the penumbral right to privacy
recognized from, inter alia the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as from a
statement in Morton Salt that corporations “can claim no equality with individuals in
the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”164 This test is consistent with the APA’s House
Judiciary Committee Report, which opined that an agency “investigation must be
substantially and demonstrably necessary to agency operations.”165 The effect of this
distinction may be a lower bar for the responding party to show irrelevance,166
especially if the responding party is a third party who is not the target of the agency’s
investigation.167
Third, the subpoena must not be “too indefinite”168 or “unreasonably broad,”169
and it must be “sufficiently limited in scope.”170 Federal privilege law governs the
subpoena’s scope.171

159. 379 U.S. 48, 49–51, 57–58 (1964).
160. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Okla. Press Publ’g Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359
(1989) (enforcing this requirement in a more modern case).
161. FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
162. Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting FTC v.
Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
163. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d at 1090.
164. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652 (citing United States v. White 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
165. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 264 (1946).
166. McVane v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re McVane), 44 F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir.
1995); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Doe v. United States,
253 F.3d 256, 269–70 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the same standard of reasonable relevance
applied to [certain] corporate records” and “should also be applied to request for the private
financial records of corporate officials”).
167. McVane, 44 F.3d at 1137–38.
168. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 636–37 (1950).
169. See cases cited supra note 141.
170. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).
171. See cases cited supra note 145.
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Fourth, the subpoena cannot be “unduly burdensome.”172 Once challenged, the
burden is on the agency to show that the subpoena does not impose undue burdens.173
There are very few cases in which a court has quashed a subpoena on this basis.174
These showings are not needed until the subpoena is challenged in court; a judicial
warrant is not a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena.175 To serve
a subpoena in the first place, an agency does not need probable cause176 or reasonable
suspicion.177 The agency need only be “reasonable,” which means compliance with
the above criteria.178 Nor must the agency “make a preliminary finding of liability
before it can even initiate an investigation.”179 One possible exception is that, in the
D.C. Circuit at least, an agency must demonstrate an “articulable suspicion” of
liability to enforce a subpoena for personal financial information.180 The fact that
probable cause in the criminal sense is not required provides another incentive for
agency investigators to start building their case with civil investigative tools as
opposed to criminal investigative tools.
Judicial review of agency subpoenas to determine compliance with the above
criteria is “strictly limited” on account of “the important governmental interest in the
expeditious investigation of possible unlawful activity.”181 “Courts generally defer
to an agency’s interpretation of the scope of its own investigation.”182 During
proceedings to quash, a court will not hear substantive defenses that the investigated
party may have to the underlying investigation during its pendency.183 Arguments

172. See case cited supra note 146.
173. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Md. Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 476 (4th Cir.
1986); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Child.’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1428
(9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); cf. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 1981)
(putting the burden on the affected party to show that compliance would impose an
unreasonable burden), abrogated on other grounds by Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings
(Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997).
174. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603–
04 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (finding subpoena unduly burdensome, but conditioning enforcement on
agency’s willingness to enter a confidentially agreement).
175. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
176. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978); see Camara v. Mun. Ct. of
S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
177. De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950).
178. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51, 57–58 (1964).
179. In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
180. Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The “articulable
suspicion” requirement also applies to determining an individual’s ability to pay a civil
penalty. In re Sealed Case, 42 F.3d at 1417.
181. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Texaco, 555 F.2d at 872).
182. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854
F.3d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1315–
16 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304,
1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
183. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 879.
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that the respondent is not within the agency’s jurisdiction may typically only be made
in defense of an administratively exhausted final enforcement action.184 Another nigh
insurmountable challenge is that an investigated party might not know that an
administrative subpoena went out to a third party or might not have standing to
challenge the demand.185
If the movant succeeds in enforcement proceedings, the remedy is unclear. Courts
sometimes imply that the agency need only reissue the problematic subpoena within
certain parameters186 and sometimes suggest the subpoena is executable as modified
by the court.187 Regardless of the procedure that the agency must undertake going
forward, it is typically not difficult or burdensome for the agency to quickly demand
from a party the maximum amount of information that it is allowed. Even when the
subpoena is quashed, the remedy is often “limited to a judicial requirement that the
agency narrow the scope of the subpoena or identify the materials sought with greater
specificity.”188
Yet courts will, albeit rarely, vindicate the right not to be investigated beyond
statutory authority once the investigation and the final agency action has concluded.
One circuit court held that an agency’s “comprehensive initial investigation . . .
pursuant to the Secretary’s standard practice exceeded his statutory authority from
the outset.”189 In fashioning a remedy, that court simply struck the administrative
findings of violations and awards against the investigated party.190
The following chart summarizes the domain of administrative subpoenas before
and after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Oklahoma Press Publishing and Morton
Salt. The chart compares these standards with the standards for grand jury
subpoenas—investigative subpoenas used for a criminal investigative purpose.

184. See McLane Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017);
CSG Workforce Partners, LLC v. Watson, 512 F. App’x 830, 836 (10th Cir. 2013); Donovan
v. Shaw, 668 F.2d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 584 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage,
513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
185. Berkower, supra note 90, at 2275–76.
186. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Tricore Reference Lab’ys., 849 F.3d 929, 943
(10th Cir. 2017) (“Our decision [quashing the EEOC’s subpoena] should not preclude the
EEOC from formulating a request for information to overcome the concerns discussed in this
opinion.”); see McVane v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re McVane), 44 F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d
Cir. 1995) (implying same).
187. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603
(S.D. Ind. 2001) (permitting enforcement as modified by the court); Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2002) (implying such).
188. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.2 (citing United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d
749 (4th Cir. 1973)); cf. In re Grand Jury Proc., 601 F.2d 162, 166–67 (5th Cir. 1979) (grand
jury).
189. Greater Mo. Med. Pro-Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 1139 (8th Cir.
2015).
190. Id.
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Table 3. Comparison of Procedural Protections for Administrative Subpoenas
Before and After Oklahoma Press Publishing (1946) and Morton Salt (1950), with
Grand Jury Subpoenas
Issue

Administrative
Investigations
before 1950

Administrative
Investigations after
1950

Grand Jury Subpoena

Preissuance role of
Article III judge?

No191

No192

Yes; convened under
auspices of judge193

Standard for
issuance?

Indeterminate;
potentially
requiring
probable cause194

Whether agency
“plainly lacks”
jurisdiction195

Discretionary; “as it
considers appropriate”196

Relevance?

Limited to cases
“where the
investigations
concern a
specific breach of
the law”197

Must be “reasonably
relevant”198

Must be a reasonable
possibility that category of
materials Government
seeks will produce
information relevant to
general subject of
investigation199

Breadth?

No roving
“fishing
expeditions;”
must specify a
reasonable period
of time and
reasonably
particular
subjects200

Cannot be “too
indefinite”201

Limited by function
toward the possible return
of an indictment202

Unduly burdensome
standard?

Not explicitly203

Yes204

No; reasonableness and
oppressiveness standard205

191. See, e.g., Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 415–16 (1908); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942).
192. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
194. See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936) (“An investigation not based upon specified
grounds is quite as objectionable as a search warrant not based upon specific statements of
fact.”).
195. See cases cited supra note 133.
196. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
197. Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908).
198. See case cited supra note 159.
199. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
200. FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
201. See cases cited supra note 142.
202. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
203. See Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Am. Tobacco Co.,
264 U.S. at 29; Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
204. See cases cited supra note 146.
205. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
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Not explicitly206

No207

Yes208

Apparently postissuance209

While a subpoena
may be challenged
before final agency
action, the
investigation itself
otherwise may
typically only be
made after final
action; no meaningful
judicial predetermination.210

Postissuance as to the
subpoena;211 however,
grand juries cannot
“engage in arbitrary
fishing expeditions, nor
may they select targets of
investigation out of malice
or an intent to harass.”212

We now shift to administrative search warrants, which are less difficult to
challenge than administrative subpoenas. A warrant is generally required before an
agency may conduct a “search” within the Fourth Amendment.213 The Supreme
Court has recognized exceptions for a motley assortment of certain regulated
industries: those involving liquor,214 firearms,215 mining,216 and junkyards217—but
not hotel operation218 or commercial activity generally.219
To validly execute an administrative warrant, an agency must provide a court with
discrete evidence of an existing violation220 or a “reasonable belief” or “reasonable
suspicion.”221 The search must be part of a general, neutral administrative plan.222
An agency may not conduct an investigation outside the scope of its authority,
although probable cause in the criminal sense is not required.223
We reiterate that the landscape is different in the criminal context (although that
lies beyond the scope of this Article). Also, “evidence implicating diminished
privacy interests or for a corporation’s own books” might not be protected by the
Fourth Amendment.224

206. See cases cited supra note 203.
207. See cases cited supra note 139.
208. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2428 (2020); United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498
U.S. 292, 299–301 (1991).
209. See Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 415–16 (1908).
210. See cases cited supra note 184.
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
212. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. at 299.
213. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 & n.23 (1978).
214. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
215. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
216. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
217. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
218. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424–25 (2015).
219. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
220. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978).
221. In re Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990).
222. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320–21.
223. Id. at 320.
224. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 & n.5 (2018) (footnote omitted)
(citing cases including United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 634, 651–53 (1950);
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Another amendment in the Bill of Rights that protects subjects of agency
investigations is the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.225 Regarding
revealing document contents, this Clause protects the respondent only from
compelled self-incrimination.226 This hinges on how the documents were originally
prepared; if the responding party prepared business records voluntarily, even before
the investigation, then the compulsion is constitutional.227
Under the same reasoning, regarding the act of document production, the SelfIncrimination Clause may be invoked only when the subpoena or warrant “compels
the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and
an incriminating effect.”228 Those aspects may be present, for example, if
“[c]ompliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers
demanded.”229 But where a respondent is required to comply with a regulatory
regime unrelated to criminal law enforcement—as is often the case with regulated
industries—there is no Self-Incrimination Clause privilege available.230
Moreover, the Self-Incrimination Clause is inapplicable with regard to third-party
subpoenas.231 The Self-Incrimination Clause may, however, be invoked in an agency
investigation to protect against a disclosure that the respondent reasonably believes
could be used against it in a criminal proceeding or could lead to other such
evidence.232
The Supreme Court interprets the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to
provide even less protection against improper agency investigations.233 Writing for
the Court in 1960, Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that due process “is an elusive
concept,” but that “when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication,
as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not
necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.”234 The Due Process
Clause tolerates an agency using its subpoena power to gather evidence adverse to a
person under investigation without notifying him or her, as “an administrative

Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 189, 204–08 (1946)).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
226. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 612–13.
229. Id. at 613 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)); United States
v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–45 (2000); see also In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, 908 F.3d
525, 528 (9th Cir. 2018).
230. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1948) (introducing the required records
doctrine that is an exception to the Fifth Amendment); Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555–60 (1990).
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984)
(“The rationale of this doctrine is that the Constitution proscribes only compelled selfincrimination, and, whatever may be the pressures exerted upon the person to whom a
subpoena is directed, the subpoena surely does not ‘compel’ anyone else to be a witness against
himself.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
232. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
233. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
234. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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investigation adjudicates no legal rights.”235 Similarly, the right of cross-examination
generally does not apply in agency investigations.236
The Due Process Clause will also permit an agency to work on an initially civil
investigation that results only in a criminal prosecution.237 As the Supreme Court has
held, “[t]he discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper
administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative
scheme suspect.”238 There is thus a very low barrier to a law enforcement agency
referring a matter to an administrative agency. Parallel investigations do not violate
civil liberties so long as the agency is not investigating solely to obtain evidence for
a criminal prosecution, it did not fail to advise the defendant that a criminal
prosecution has been contemplated, and there are no “other special
circumstances.”239 Stated differently, courts have approved administrative
proceedings that result from a criminal referral, so long as the criminal investigation
did not interfere with the agency’s operations and the parallel proceedings are
conducted in “good faith.”240 The reason: if “investigators suspected that a particular
store might contain evidence of other crimes, the investigators would be precluded
from performing any administrative inspection of that store.”241 This nevertheless
leaves open an obvious potential for abuse.242
There are some boundaries in place to prevent agency officials who cannot meet
the higher standard from doing this with the hope or intent of transitioning to criminal
liability. An agency cannot conduct an investigation when its true purpose is a
criminal investigation,243 that is, an investigation that is not “for a purely
administrative purpose,” but rather one that carries the “real threat of criminal
sanctions.”244 Courts have been mollified by the fact that “while information
obtained by an administrative subpoena could be shared with prosecutors and used
in a criminal investigation, grand jury secrecy would prevent information from

235. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. at 742 (citing Hannah, 363 U.S. at 440–43).
236. Hannah, 363 U.S. at 445–46.
237. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Both the Supreme Court
and this circuit have long applied [the reasonableness] test when reviewing administrative
subpoena requests, and we see no convincing basis upon which to distinguish these binding
precedents simply because this subpoena was issued pursuant to a criminal, as opposed to
civil, investigation.”); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 917 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
administrative subpoena was enforceable, even though it had “potential criminal
ramifications,” because it was “issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal
prosecution”).
238. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987) (citing United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579, 583–84, 584 n.4 (1983)).
239. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970).
240. Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and Law
Enforcement Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77, 89–90 (2013).
241. United States v. Mansour, 252 F. Supp. 3d 182, 202 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing United
States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1985)).
242. Persaud, supra note 240, at 95–99 (citing possible examples).
243. Id. at 80 n.27.
244. Jacob v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 385, 390 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973).
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moving in the other direction.”245 That said, other courts have suggested that an
administrative warrant may be taken when the agency’s aim is not solely to build a
criminal case.246 Because the Supreme Court—as with most facets of investigative
acts—has not addressed this question in decades, a contemporary challenge that
raises these issues could result in a different outcome.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, there are many limitations in using the
U.S. Constitution to deter an agency from using an improper investigatory tool or to
challenge the use of such a tool. Even if a regulated entity could try to make out a
Bivens247 claim on the above, damages are the only available remedy, and they are
based on a predicate finding of unconstitutional conduct. It would not seem that a
court could halt an investigation, but at least one court has commented that it was
unaware of case law permitting a Bivens remedy in the context of an agency
investigation.248
Putting aside whether a position is likely to succeed in the long run, the case law
generally does not permit a respondent to raise any merits defenses in challenging an
agency action. There is also a lack of post-enforcement accountability. A motion to
quash an administrative warrant may be moot where the warrant has been fully
executed prior to the appeal.249 The respondent would have to argue, for example,
that the issue is evading review yet capable of repetition. Unless the party is
frequently investigated by the same agency, this showing may be difficult.
2. Constitutional Separation of Powers
The Constitution can constrain overzealous agency investigations through not just
the Bill of Rights, but also through its structure-of-government provisions.250 As
Professor Nicholas Bagley has written, “Congress and the president both remain on
the scene, fully capable of reforming or restraining agencies.”251 Through Article I,
Congress may exercise control over certain agency investigations—beyond, of
course, legislating directly on the matter.252
Article I is the font from which the Supreme Court infers the Nondelegation
Doctrine.253 Some scholars hold the view that the administrative agencies have

245. Berkower, supra note 90, at 2264; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970).
247. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action lay against a federal officer
for violating an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 389.
248. Casella v. United States, 642 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).
249. Koppers Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1990) (CERCLA warrant).
250. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
251. Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2019) (footnote
omitted).
252. See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1984).
253. See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 942 (citing FTC v. Balt. Grain
Co., 284 F. 886, 888, 890 (D. Md. 1922) (overbroad delegation would be “beyond any power
which Congress can confer”), aff’d, 267 U.S. 586 (1924)); Ronald A. Cass, Delegation
Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 147, 178 (2017); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 335–53 (2002).
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become microcosms of government unto themselves, with Article III judicial review
constrained by the APA to final agency action.254 If challengers can reinvigorate the
long dormant Nondelegation Doctrine, then they may be able to challenge agency
investigatory methods on the basis that Congress did not intend to delegate such
broad authority to the agency—depending, of course, on the exact agency, organic
statute, and investigatory method used.255
Another way Congress can restrain agency investigative acts is through its
oversight power.256 Naturally, members of Congress disagree over how they want
the government and its agencies to run.257 Nevertheless, “[l]egislators tend to
prioritize the investigation and monitoring of executive bureaucracies,” because it
helps them achieve policy goals and “lets them claim credit for making the
government work more efficiently and effectively.”258 Oversight can be “police
patrol oversight”—more routinized oversight characterized by constant vigilance of
what an agency is doing—versus “fire alarm oversight,” in which Congress waits for
interest groups, the public, the media, or inspectors general to draw Congress’s
attention to an agency problem.259
Oversight may occur formally by committees holding oversight hearings. For
example, the House held a hearing on the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation
authority: “The Federal Trade Commission and Its Section 5 Authority: Prosecutor,
Judge, and Jury.”260 The hearing examined the FTC’s broad authority to prohibit
unfair or deceptive trade practices and specifically heard testimony concerning the
FTC’s issuance of subpoenas to forty LabMD employees.261 Oversight can proceed
less formally than committee and subcommittee hearings. Congressional staff can
examine agency investigative practices by asking questions of the agency directly
and requesting documents.262 Members can directly contact the White House for help
influencing how an agency investigates.263 Congress can use its appropriations power
to fund or defund the agency as a whole or parts of the agency to control how the

254. Lawson, supra note 124.
255. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new
federal laws restricting liberty.”); id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring); Paul v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
256. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1459–66 (2003).
257. Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 274–75.
258. Id. at 296–97.
259. Id. at 297 (citing Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166–68 (1984)).
260. See The Federal Trade Commission and Its Section 5 Authority: Prosecutor, Judge,
and Jury: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2014),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg90892/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg90892.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GNU9-376M].
261. Id. at 9.
262. Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 297 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 235–44
(1989)).
263. Id.
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agency conducts investigations.264 Scholars have questioned whether congressional
oversight is actually effective.265 Conversely, agencies may internalize congressional
oversight signaling as a mechanism to mitigate the adverse attention that flows from
acting in defiance to congressional concerns.266
Congress may also, of course, enact statutes channeling or directing agency
investigation processes. Reporting statutes are one example. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993267 “requires federal agencies to develop longterm strategic plans to clarify their missions, develop short-term performance plans
to identify performance measures for outputs and outcomes, and report to Congress
on how they performed against those goals.”268
Another Article I check on agency investigations is the strategic use of the
Senate’s confirmation powers. Officers of the United States must be appointed in
accordance with Article II.269 The Constitution thus permits Congress to freeze the
consideration of nominees or reject them outright in response to agency
investigations or information sharing—even indirect to the nominee or the
nomination itself—that proceed contrary to Congress’s wishes.270
B. Statutory Constraints
1. Administrative Procedure Act
The Constitution provides the minimum procedural and substantive rights against
agency investigative acts. With the APA’s prescriptive positive procedures for
agency adjudication and rulemaking and its waiver of sovereign immunity to
facilitate judicial review, one might assume that the statute similarly confers positive
procedures for agency investigations and procedural protections to individuals who
are the subject of investigative acts. As demonstrated in the chart and analysis below,
the APA imposed no meaningful constraints on administrative investigation.

264. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
265. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011,
2081 (2017).
266. See id. at 2045; Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
267. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 283
(codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 31, and 39 of the U.S. Code).
268. Matthew S. Schoen, Good Enough for Government Work?: The Government
Performance Results Act of 1993 and Its Impact on Federal Agencies, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 455, 456–57 (2008) (footnote omitted).
269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
270. See, e.g., Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, The Senate’s Record-Breaking
Gridlock Under Trump, POLITICO (June 8, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/06/08/senate-record-breaking-gridlocktrump-303811 [https://perma.cc/WR2AQXQA].
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Table 4. Administrative Procedure Act Explicit Treatment of Agency Investigative
Acts
APA Section
5 U.S.C. § 555(c)
5 U.S.C. § 555(d)
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)

Effect
Standard for administrative subpoenas: must be
enforced “as provided for by law”
Procedural basis to challenge administrative
subpoenas and “similar process or demand”
Miscellaneous provisions, including the limited
constraints on administrative law judges reporting to
agency investigators

The drafting history of the APA evinces little consideration of investigative
acts.271 The Supreme Court held that the APA procedures available for adjudications
and rulemakings do not apply to agency investigations.272 Indeed, one of the few
APA provisions concerning investigative acts arises in a section entitled “Ancillary
matters.”273
The APA contains investigation-specific provisions, although they have not been
vigorously invoked by litigants or applied by courts.274 In 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), the APA
acknowledges agency civil investigations by stating that an employee who
participated in the investigation may not make a formal adjudication of the resulting
matter.275 Under § 555(d), affected parties and agencies may go to court to contest or
enforce, respectively, “subp[o]ena[s] or similar process or demand.”276 These
provisions were intended to leave unchanged the existing (i.e., pre-1946) law on
judicial review of subpoenas.277
This part of the APA is unclear and rarely litigated—especially so in the past few
decades.278 When an affected party challenges a subpoena or similar process, the few

271. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 113, at 66–69, 131–32. The Supreme Court has deferred to the Attorney General’s Manual
on the APA to the extent it does not conflict with the APA. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979).
272. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452–53 (1960).
273. 5 U.S.C. § 555.
274. We note that our definition of an “investigative act” excludes an agency proceeding
governed by positive APA procedures. We do not consider § 555(c) and (d) to provide such
procedures. Otherwise, because those sections do relate to investigative acts, counting them
as positive APA procedures would have the exclusion swallow the rule and exclude everything
we have yet deemed to be an agency investigation.
275. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
276. Id. § 555(d).
277. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 113, at 68–69, 131–32.
278. As of November 14, 2021, Westlaw recorded only 1411 case citations to the entirety
of 5 U.S.C. § 555, although approximately 100 of those cases were decided in the last year
alone. The database shows that of those, there are only 38 cases that use the term “555(c)” or
“6(b)” (which is the section of the APA codified at 5 U.S.C. § 555(c)). Westlaw also shows
that of those 1411 cases, there are only 40 cases that use the term “555(d)” or “6(c)” (which is
the section of the APA codified at 5 U.S.C. § 555(d)). These meager figures are overinclusive,
as some of these cases cite to provisions within sections 555(c) and (d) that do not relate to
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courts to consider this provision have held that the agency bears the burden to show
that the subpoena is for a lawful purpose.279
The APA includes a substantive standard for a litigant to reference when invoking
the cause of action available under § 555(d). Under 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), any
investigative act—including subpoenas, process, inspection, and so forth—must be
made and enforced “as authorized by law.”280 This provision appears separate from
the familiar APA cause of action in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), which provides for the setting
aside of final agency action that is contrary to law or is “arbitrary or capricious.”281
As with the procedural § 555(d), litigants rarely invoke § 555(c) to challenge agency
investigations. Both have been used sparingly.282 This may be consistent with the
APA drafters’ expectation that this standard was a mere “restatement of existing
law.”283 Interestingly, the House Judiciary Committee Report broadly declared that
the provision codified at § 555(c) was “designed to preclude ‘fishing expedition’ and
investigations beyond the jurisdiction or authority” of an agency.284 However, the
enacted provision—barring investigative process “except as authorized by law”—is
textually weaker than the Committee Report’s remark suggests.
Nevertheless, § 555(c) may be significant because it is not coextensive with
§ 706(2), a distinct solution for challenging investigative behavior. Section 706(2) is
subject to the requirement that the challenged agency conduct be “final,”285 whereas
the provision for judicial review of agency investigative tools appears to be
unencumbered by that qualification.286 Another constraint applicable to adjudication
and rulemaking, § 553, does not to apply to § 555(d) actions because an investigation
does not appear to be an adjudication or rulemaking under the APA’s definition of
those terms.287
There are several arguments to be made for using these APA provisions to more
robustly police investigative acts. The APA House Judiciary Committee Report went
further than what the sparse § 555(c) and (d) case law holds. The Committee claimed
that by restricting investigative acts to those “authorized by law,” the APA

investigative acts or cite to completely distinct uses of those sections.
279. United States v. Sec. State Bank & Tr., 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing “the
acceptable practice under analogous administrative schemes”).
280. 5 U.S.C. § 555(c).
281. Id. § 706(2).
282. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 525 F.2d
900, 906 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 646 (1950)
(implying a § 555(c) violation is judicially enforceable); Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350
(5th Cir. 1970) (same); In re FTC Corp. Patterns Rep. Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at
*2 (D.D.C. July 11, 1977) (same).
283. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 113, at 66; see also ASIMOW, supra note 8, at 47 (“The provision seems to add nothing to
existing law.” (footnote omitted)).
284. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 264 (1946). One court has held that the APA does not
prohibit “fishing expeditions” in and of themselves, but rather ultra vires “fishing
expeditions.” Pac. Westbound Conf. v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1964).
285. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
286. See id. § 555(c), (d) (not referring to judicial review “agency action,” which § 704
generally requires to be final).
287. Id. § 551(5), (7); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452–53 (1960).
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authorized quashing investigative acts that “disturb or disrupt personal privacy, or
unreasonably interfere with private occupation or enterprise.”288 The Report also
warned agencies that their investigations “should be conducted so as to interfere in
the least degree compatible with adequate law enforcement.”289
However, the enacted bill does not textually incorporate these principles, and
these guideposts were not repeated in the influential Attorney General’s Manual.290
They have been cited precisely once by a federal court—in 1964.291 Further, under
pre-APA case law, which the Attorney General’s Manual concluded was left intact
by the APA, until final agency action occurs to a respondent’s detriment, a court
cannot determine whether the respondent is actually subject to the law the agency is
purporting to enforce.292 Also, the § 555(d) standard, that an agency investigation is
“authorized by law,” is, according to one court, merely coextensive with the
§ 706(2)(A) “arbitrary or capricious” standard.293
There is also uncertainly as to what “law” an agency subpoena or warrant could
be quashed for violating. The Attorney General’s Manual states, “‘Law’ refers to the
statutes which a particular agency administers, together with relevant judicial
decisions.”294 At the very least, “law” should include the Constitution. Some courts
hold that only the organic statute can be the authorizing “law,” which tends to tip the
scales against the affected parties.295 Some courts hold only federal law is the
authorizing “law,” not state law.296 And some courts hold that even the agency’s
regulations can be the authorizing “law,” which tips the scales in favor of the
agency.297 Depending on the meaning of “law,” the standards to which an agency
subpoena or warrant could be held might be higher than the mere constitutional
minimums discussed later in this Article.
That is the extent of APA review for a party aggrieved by an agency investigation.
Standard § 706 review does not apply to investigative acts because that provision

288. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 264 (1946).
289. Id.
290. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 113, at 66.
291. Pac. Westbound Conf. v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 n.10 (9th Cir. 1964).
292. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 113, at 69 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943)); Okla. Press
Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (“Nothing in the language of section 6(c) suggests
any purpose to change this established rule.”)); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S.
290 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
293. In re FTC Corp. Patterns Rep. Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *2 (D.D.C. July
11, 1977) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) and noting that Morton
Salt was reviewed under § 555 alone and not § 706).
294. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 113, at 69.
295. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350, 1358 (D. Wyo. 1983);
see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 646 (1950); see also Appeal of FTC Line
of Bus. Rep. Litig., 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (finding that the “law” referred
to is at least the agency’s organic statute).
296. Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1970).
297. Id.
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requires “final agency action,” which agency investigations are definitionally not.298
The Supreme Court has held that an agency’s initiation of an investigation is not final
agency action,299 which would reasonably include antecedent investigatory acts. This
decision perhaps would have come out differently if decided today, given more
recent court cases and the analysis in this Article. Relying on that case, lower courts
have held that certain investigation-related acts do not constitute final agency
action,300 including informational reports after investigation301 or certain decisions
not to investigate.302
That is not to say that no agency act associated with an investigation can be a final
agency action. Some cases in recent years have subverted the notion that such a bright
line exists. In 2016, the Supreme Court held in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v.
Hawkes Co. that an approved jurisdictional determination by the Corps is final
agency action.303 The affected parties successfully argued that the jurisdictional
determination imposed practical burdens on them and thus met the test of finality.304
The Hawkes decision creates the possibility of placing other marginal investigative
activity under the purview of federal jurisdiction. For example, agency investigatory
tools could constitute final agency action if they are not ad hoc, but rather the agency
has developed a program, policy, or practice of investigations that crosses the line
into full rule territory.305
Agency investigative acts are also arguably prosecutorial decisions (at least where
the organic statute does not require the commencement of an investigation because
of a specific trigger).306 This renders them presumptively unreviewable under
Heckler v. Chaney307 or subject to the APA’s discretionary fiat308 via the organic

298. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704.
299. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239–45 (1980); Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast
Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (“An agency’s initiation of an investigation does not
constitute final agency action.”).
300. E.g., Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d
726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Martin v. Naval Criminal Investigative Serv., 539 F. App’x 830,
832 (9th Cir. 2013); Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 180
F.3d 1192, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 1999).
301. Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2017); Joshi v. Nat’l
Transp. Safety Bd., 791 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015); cf. United States v. L.A. & Salt Lake R.R.
Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309–10 (1927).
302. Jallali v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 437 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
303. 578 U.S. 590 (2016).
304. Id.; see also Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(agreeing that “legal consequences flow from” an agency letter “because it makes [the
regulated party] eligible for civil penalties in any future enforcement action"); CSI Aviation
Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding an
“immediate and significant burden” where the government “flexed its regulatory muscle”).
305. See U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1150 (5th Cir. 1984).
306. Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730, 733 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dicta); In re FTC
Corp. Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *3 (D.D.C. July 11, 1977).
307. 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding discretionary action is an exception to the presumption
in favor of judicial review of agency action).
308. 5 U.S.C. § 701. This is to the extent that investigative acts are not reviewable under,
for example, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d).
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statute. The Constitution’s respect for horizontal separation of powers also compels
that result.309 Thus, courts should generally refrain from inserting themselves into
decisions of how agencies should use their resources.310
But for immunity to be granted based on prosecutorial discretion, the statute must
truly give the agency discretion to investigate or not investigate. As one example, the
D.C. Circuit has found justiciable the Food and Drug Administration’s failure to
initiate certain enforcement actions against a pharmaceutical wholesaler after the
court interpreted a statute to entirely deprive the FDA of discretion to decline.311
Because the organic statute forced the FDA to take enforcement action, that decision
was not “committed to agency discretion by law”312 and thus was subject to APA
review.313 The upshot is that Congress may sometimes directly cabin executive
prosecutorial discretion and, by extension, investigation discretion.314
Whether an agency investigation can be challenged under 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) or
§ 706, parties have no ability to raise substantive defenses during the agency
investigation that will bear on their enforcement proceeding. For example, the parties
cannot successfully raise claims of collateral estoppel,315 argue that the act upon
which the investigation is based does not apply to respondents, or contest that the
respondents are within the agency’s jurisdiction.316 As it stands, this raises a
separation of powers consideration, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his City of
Arlington v. FCC dissent.317
One benefit the APA does provide challengers is their ability to be represented
by counsel at hearings or interviews. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does
not attach until after the agency has moved beyond the investigative stage,”318 but

309. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of
Legal Couns., to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Leg. Affs. (Apr. 8, 2002);
Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect
Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 541 n.280 (2017).
310. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689, 716 (1990).
311. Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7–10 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
312. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
313. Cook, 733 F.3d at 10 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985)).
314. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see
also Greer v. Chao, 492 F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F.
Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1992)).
315. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
316. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.
Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
317. 569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]here is another concern at
play, no less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the Judiciary
not only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as well.”).
318. RONALD F. WRIGHT, ORGANIZATION OF ADJUDICATIVE OFFICES IN EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS
AND
AGENCIES
542
(1993)
(footnote
omitted),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1993-Statement%2316%
20Organization%20of%20Adjudicative%20Offices%20in%20Executive%20Departments%
20and%20Agencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8G8-GPDY]; cf. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S.
25 (1976) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is limited to criminal
proceedings).
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the APA permits a party compelled to appear before an agency to be accompanied,
represented, and advised by an attorney.319
As an additional minor point, one of the APA’s other few references to
investigative action is its prohibition on administrative law judges being supervised
by employees who investigate on behalf of the agency.320 Similarly, an investigating
employee generally may not be involved in the decision except as witness or
counsel.321 A violation of these structural limitations would presumably give rise to
a challenge that the agency action rendered was unlawful for failing to observe
required procedures.322 However, non-administrative-law-judges are not subject to
these requirements.323
2. Non-APA Statutory Constraints
Some agencies’ organic statutes erect additional constraints, both in terms of
substantive controls and independent oversight.324 Under the Inspector General Act
of 1978, inspectors general “conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating
to the programs and operations” of the executive departments.325 The Inspector
General Act requires the agency to give its inspectors general “timely access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other
materials available to the” agency and which “relate to” the inspector general’s
responsibilities.326 Inspectors general may also issue subpoenas to non-federal
agencies and take testimony of “any person,” 327 though they may not issue subpoenas
to federal agencies.328
These provisions have caused friction between the inspectors general and the
heads of executive agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Some
agency heads have contended that they alone hold the authority to release documents,
and even if they do not, the agency head determines which documents are “relate[d]”
to the programs and operations under review.329 To the contrary, inspectors general

319. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
320. Id. § 554(d)(2).
321. Id. § 554(d).
322. Id. § 706(2)(D).
323. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (rejecting this challenge under the Due
Process Clause).
324. E.g., Letter from FTC Inspector General Roslyn A. Mazer to Jason Chaffetz,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, & Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking
Member, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://causeofaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ORIGINAL-Signed-OIG-Letter-toHOGR-staff-9-30-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK3M-B7YS].
325. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1–2. Some agencies have their inspectors general authorized under
other authorities. See generally CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER app. B (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R45450/4 [https://perma.cc/6H2A-JB3D].
326. 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(1).
327. Id. § 6(a)(5).
328. Id. § 6(a)(4).
329. Obstructing Oversight: Concerns from Inspectors General: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz,

2022]

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

457

have argued in favor of permitting access to agency records so that the agency cannot
stonewall the inspectors general.330
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides another bulwark. Under an
earlier version of FOIA and case law from the 1970s, investigatory files remained
exempt from public disclosure even after agency proceedings terminated.331 But
now, an agency must produce a requested record unless its disclosure meets one of
six conditions, such as that it “could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings” or could disclose law enforcement techniques.332
Under that broad rubric, regulated entities and individuals can use FOIA to
request information on investigations.333 For example, ProPublica has used FOIA to
research the Department of Health and Human Services and the investigation-closeout letters it sent to healthcare providers.334 Although not under FOIA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission releases a full set of materials contained in a
charge file at the conclusion of its investigation, although apparently only to the
person who filed the charge under its own statute.335 The FOIA constraint is of
limited efficacy. Courts tend to defer to agencies in their assertions of exemptions.336
Agencies are disincentivized from complying with the requests.337 FOIA responses
are also only as good as the information that the agency collects, which can be
limited.338
Another statute that provides protections is the Privacy Act of 1974. The Act is
useful not because it substantively limits how an agency undertakes its investigative
acts but because it limits the fruits of those acts—thereby serving as a backend check.
This Act prohibits federal agencies from “disclos[ing] any record which is contained
in a system of records by any means” to another agency unless the individual whose
information is in the record consents, or if the disclosure would be for a “routine use”
or for a “civil or criminal law enforcement activity” provided a certain written request
is made.339 A “routine use” is defined as “the use of such record for a purpose which
is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.”340 The “law enforcement
activity” exception is broader than criminal investigations, and does not require an

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/201912/09.10.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXE2-EL34].
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
332. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
333. Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204 (2018).
334. Id. at 2212 (citing Charles Ornstein, The Secret Documents that Detail How Patients’
Privacy Is Breached, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/the-secret-documents-that-detail-how-patients-privacy-is-breached
[https://perma.cc/UQQ8-Y2TS].
335. Id. at 2238.
336. Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Oversight of Oversight: A Proposal for More
Effective FOIA Reform, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 525, 535–37 (2017).
337. Id. at 529–31 (describing how agencies take advantage of FOIA’s ambiguities and
gaps).
338. Kwoka, supra note 316, at 2221.
339. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3), (7).
340. Id. § 552a(a)(7).
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active investigation or a “current law enforcement necessity.”341 The agency faces
penalties for violations. For example, if an agency releases records to another agency
without an exception to the Privacy Act, liability can lie against the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.342 Relatedly, for several agencies, the agency’s
employees are subject to criminal penalties (fines of up to $5,000 and imprisonment
of up to a year) for disclosing any information obtained by the agency (presumably
through its investigation) without the agency’s authority.343 The Privacy Act provides
another incentive for agencies to carefully conduct their investigations and to be
careful with what they do with the information obtained through their investigations.
C. Executive Branch Constraints
Though often impermanent, the Executive Branch can and occasionally does selfimpose limiting principles to its investigative practices. The latest significant
iterations of this behavior were a pair of executive orders issued in 2019—now
revoked—titled Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in
Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication (“Executive Order 13,892”) and
Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents
(“Executive Order 13,891”).344 Executive Order 13,892 prohibited agencies from
enforcing rules that they have not made publicly available prior to that enforcement
action.345 It mandated that agencies must promulgate rules of agency procedure
governing administrative inspections.346 It also encouraged agencies to offer opinion
letters to members and entities of the regulated public to facilitate knowledge of and
compliance with the law.347 Notably, Executive Order 13,892 excluded investigative
activity by the Department of Justice with respect to any “homeland security
function,” and it likewise exempted any provision of the order if any agency’s head
determined that compliance would undermine national security.348
Executive Order 13,891 added value by requiring agencies to post their guidance
documents online so that the regulated public may access them.349 This partially
mitigated the risk of secret law in the form of internal guidance documents against
which the public is held accountable but for which it is unaware.350 Most agencies

341. Maydak v. United States, 363 F.3d 512, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
342. Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–
2680.
343. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1).
344. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9. 2019); Exec. Order No. 13,892,
84 Fed. Reg. 55,239 (Oct. 9, 2019); see also Exec. Order No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,049 (Jan.
20, 2021) (revoking Exec. Orders 13,891 and 13,892).
345. Exec. Order No. 13,892, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55,241.
346. Id. at 55,240; DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY &
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 19 (2020) (“Here lies the most sobering finding: For
most government applications (61%), there is insufficient publicly available technical
documentation to determine with precision what [AI] methods are deployed.”).
347. Exec. Order No. 13,892, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55,242.
348. Id. at 55,242–43.
349. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55,236.
350. See Jonathan Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803, 812 (2018).
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took steps to comply with the executive orders.351 Taken together, Executive Orders
13,891 and 13,892 were a positive step towards mitigating the problem of
administrative investigations. Their substantial exclusions, limited scope, and
express disclaiming of creating any substantive right to the regulated public left more
to be done in the space of presidential actions and the lesser field of agency selfrestraint.352 In tacit recognition of this point, the Office of Management and Budget
published a request for information in the Federal Register in January 2020, seeking
“ideas that will ensure each and every American enjoys adequate protections in
regulatory enforcements and adjudications.”353 The first topic of interest enunciated
on this score relates to investigative fairness.354
Four months later, the President signed Executive Order on Regulatory Relief to
Support Economic Recovery (“Executive Order 13,924”)—now also revoked—
which enunciated ten “principles of fairness in administrative enforcement and
adjudication” that agencies should consider in revising their “procedures and
practices.”355 Most notably, section 6(g) states that “[a]dministrative enforcement
should be free of improper Government coercion.”356 Notwithstanding the efficacy
of presidential actions to cause behavioral change, the efficacy of such actions is
contingent on the will across executive branch agencies to enforce them as well as
the variable agency-specific interpretations of the meaning of “coercion” and the
types of “governmental coercion” that are “improper.”357 And, when agencies
comply with executive orders, agencies’ interpretations can naturally vary.358
However, in furtherance of section 6 of Executive Order 13,924, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs issued an implementing memo with over twenty
unique best practices for agencies to consider and apply to their rules of procedure
and management.359 By December 2020, multiple cabinet agencies had modified
their rules.360

351. See Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures, 84 Fed.
Reg. 71,714 (Dec. 27, 2019) (Department of Transportation’s response to Exec. Orders 13,891
and 13,892); Clyde Wayne Crews, A One-Stop Executive Order 13891 Guidance Document
Portal, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://cei.org/blog/one-stop-executiveorder-13891-guidance-document-portal [https://perma.cc/2KL6-WETX].
352. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55,238; Exec. Order No. 13,892, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55,243; cf. David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 168, 180–85 (2018) (discussing the jurisprudential contours of the rule of law).
353. Improving and Reforming Regulatory Enforcement and Adjudication, 85 Fed. Reg.
5483, 5483 (Jan. 30, 2020).
354. Id. at 5484.
355. Exec. Order No. 13,924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,353, 31,355 (May 19, 2020); see also Exec.
Order No. 14,018, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,855 (Feb. 24, 2021) (revoking Exec. Order No. 13,924).
356. Exec. Order No. 13,924, 85 Fed. Reg. at 31,355.
357. See Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency
Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 290–91.
358. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (counseling judicial deference to
reasonable agency interpretations of executive orders).
359. Memorandum from Paul J. Ray, Adm’r, Off. of Information and Regul. Aff., to the
Deputy Sec’ys of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/M-20-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ6D-A8XU].
360. See, e.g., Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Adm’r for Enf’t &
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IV. WHY INVESTIGATIVE ACTS SHOULD BE CHECKED
Having set out what agency investigations are and how they are permitted, we
now ask: are investigative acts a good and useful thing, given the inadequate
constraints under the law to advance their legitimate purpose in the constitutional
system? In this Part, we aim to determine the positive and negative aspects of
investigative acts. Knowing what investigative acts are capable of, and their
consequences, helps inform whether more or fewer constraints on investigative acts
are necessary.
A. The Benefits of Agency Civil Investigative Behavior
Agency investigations provide Americans with significant benefits. The Attorney
General’s Committee acknowledged this before the passage of the APA, calling it
“imperative” that a “careful investigation” take place before an agency commences
formal proceedings.361 Indeed, at least for rulemaking, the Attorney General’s
Committee saw “the investigation, or study, of the problems to be dealt with” as one
of the four distinct stages in administrative rulemaking.362 The Supreme Court, too,
has noted that “it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing
that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry.”363
Agencies execute the Executive Branch’s general constitutional mandate from the
confluence of organic statutes and the Take Care clause.364 The President cannot
personally see to the creation and implementation of policy for the entire U.S. federal
government, and consequently needs a bureaucracy to carry out the functions of the
President and other officers of the United States. Agencies enforce the law and
investigate numerous subjects, including fraud,365 corruption,366 forgery,367 and
public health.368 Agencies strive to achieve these goals in many situations. Evidence

Compliance Assurance, EPA, Implementation of Executive Order 13924 (Nov. 25, 2020);
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Trans., to Secretarial
Officers & Heads of Operating Admins. (Nov. 13, 2020) https://www.transportation.gov/
mission/enforcement/implementation-section-6-executive-order-13924
[https://perma.cc/
67BC-4VGR].
361. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 47,
at 62.
362. Id. at 102.
363. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).
364. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
365. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/factsheets/ebsa-monetary-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/R773-4LCZ] (describing how in Fiscal
Year 2020, the Employee Benefits Security Administration had enforced the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act by closing 1122 civil investigations and collecting over $1.48
billion).
366. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS & RELATED PROGRAMS, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1868/FY_2020_CBJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WGY-4TKT].
367. Id.
368. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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of a regulatory violation frequently resides solely within the hands of the regulated
entity.
Investigative action helps agencies achieve their respective statutory and
executive mandates.369 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
constitutional basis for agency investigative acts “would seem clearly to be
comprehended in the ‘necessary and proper’ clause, as incidental to both
[Congress’s] general legislative and its investigative powers.”370 As Professor Davis
wrote the year after the enactment of the APA, “Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule-making, adjudication, and licensing, but
also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy,
for recommending legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating
obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.”371 Professor Sunstein has
argued that agencies have evolved to become “modern America’s common law
courts,” meaning they “specify abstract standards (often involving reasonableness)
and to adapt legal rules to particular contexts as facts, social understandings of facts,
and underlying values change over time.”372 The ability to investigate furnishes
agencies with the facts that are a necessary predicate to agency action in such a
“common law court.” That said, as the Supreme Court recently recognized, agencies’
decisions are “routinely informed” by considerations external to the affected parties:
considerations of politics, foreign relations, and national security.373 The difference
in what agencies do and what agencies regulate may lead to different uses, and
abuses, of agency investigations.374
Investigations can save resources for the agency and, collaterally, the regulated
parties. Investigative actions allow the agency to explore whether to commence an
agency action without committing to doing so. An agency saves resources by looking
into an issue within the agency’s enforcement domain without fully committing the
agency to pursuing final action.375
Agency investigations can also serve as a platform upon which it can bring
attention to issues; “[a]gencies may be able to solve collective action problems by . .
. more readily generating media attention.”376 So, too, can agency investigations lead

JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES, https://www.cdc.gov/budget/
documents/fy2021/fy-2021-cdc-congressional-justification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW8NW4LJ].
369. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1; Jack W. Campbell IV, Revoking the
“Fishing License:” Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted Restrictions on Administrative
Agencies’ Power to Subpoena Personal Financial Records, 49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1996).
370. Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946).
371. Davis, supra note 13, at 1111. The word “prosecution” in this quote seems to mean
civil prosecution, not criminal prosecution. The APA uses the same term in a civil manner as
well. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
372. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998).
373. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).
374. Bagby, supra note 7, at 349 (“The courts and the Congress should reevaluate
investigatory powers if evidence mounts of abuse by either regulators or ‘targets.’”).
375. Campbell, supra note 369, at 434.
376. Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 286.
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Congress to legislate.377 Agencies have been observed to use their civil powers
appropriately.378 However, due to the nebulous and largely non-public nature of
administrative investigations, the benefits that they generate evade precise
measurement: “[t]he costs and benefits of government investigations are diffuse.”379
B. Abuses of Agency Civil Investigative Practice
There are numerous problematic aspects of how agencies are currently
undertaking their investigatory rights, obligations, and privileges. Since the twentieth
century, government agencies have been “flush with power to make highly informal
decisions affecting people, where ‘the usual quality of justice’ may be quite low.”380
This is especially problematic where those decisions are discretionary, because
agencies may find discretionary actions to be “tempting levers to create favorable . . .
perceptions” “as a sort of signal that the public (or political superiors) can use in
forming judgments about the competence” of the agency.381 As the Supreme Court
admonished in a 1936 opinion from the era in which the Court viewed agency
investigations with skepticism, permitting an agency to compel individuals to
produce evidence in the absence of jurisdiction “violates the cardinal precept upon
which the constitutional safeguards of personal liberty ultimately rest,” and places
the government at risk of “becom[ing] an autocracy.”382
Agency investigations deploy immense investigatory power to target individuals
and entities with often crippling and voluminous document, inspection, and interview
requests.383 The announcement of an investigation can affect share prices as well as
investor and public confidence.384 When it was publicly revealed that the Department
of Justice and the FTC were launching antitrust investigations into Facebook,
Amazon, and Google’s parent company, those companies’ shares dropped 7.5%,
4.6%, and 6.1%, respectively.385
Improperly scoped agency investigations can stifle individual freedoms. Once
under investigation, an individual or entity may enter the orbit of criminal penalties
in responding to government requests for information. A misstep in the presentation
of a material fact can theoretically carry criminal consequences because making false

377. Davis, supra note 13, at 1117.
378. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1321, at 4 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3874,
3877.
379. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
380. Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 279 (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
216 (1969)).
381. Id. at 263.
382. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1936).
383. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218–19 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
384. Lauren Feiner, Facebook Tumbles on Antitrust Concerns, CNBC (June 3, 2019, 11:06
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/03/amazon-facebook-and-google-stocks-stumble-overantitrust-concerns.html [https://perma.cc/6AWJ-XNBP].
385. Id.
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statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch is a crime,386 as
is corrupt interference in an official proceeding.387 Under the FTC’s organic statute—
which applies to the many other agencies for which their respective organic statutes
incorporate the FTC’s—a person who “neglect[s] or refuse[s]” to attend, testify,
answer lawful inquiries, or produce documentary evidence in response to a federal
district court order directing compliance with the agency’s order commits a crime
punishable by a fine up to $5000, or one year of imprisonment.388
Less directly, an agency can use a civil administrative investigation to bolster a
parallel criminal case.389 An agency can often avoid judicial review and thereby
strengthen its enforcement leverage.390 Short of criminal penalties, an agency can
also take adverse action against an employee for making false statements during an
investigation of alleged misconduct by the employee.391 Although the government
may lawfully engage in “good faith” parallel civil and criminal investigations, the
standards for “good faith” are indeterminate, and even when met, the agencies may
freely exchange information without prior notice to the regulated party.392
Agency investigations can pose existential threats to the regulated entities. In
addition to the case of LabMD cited in the Introduction,393 the Consumer Product
Safety Commission aggressively investigated a company that produced magnetic
desk toys on the grounds that they were unsafe; the agency pursued personal liability

386. 18 U.S.C. § 1001; see, e.g., United States v. Stover, 499 F. App’x 267 (4th Cir. 2012)
(affirming the conviction of a mine security director who had lied during an administrative
agency deposition he voluntarily sat for).
387. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512(c).
388. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (Federal Trade Commission), incorporated by 7 U.S.C. § 1636(i)(3)
(Department of Agriculture for livestock mandatory reporting); 21 U.S.C. § 467d (Food and
Drug Administration to enforce poultry and poultry products inspection); 26 U.S.C. § 5274
(Internal Revenue Service to enforce the collection of alcohol, tobacco, and certain other
excise taxes); 27 U.S.C. § 202(g) (Department of Treasury to enforce the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act); 29 U.S.C. § 209 (Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division to
enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act). Criminal charges have been successfully brought under
such statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 728 (8th Cir. 2005).
389. Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L.
REV. 985, 986–87 (2018) (citing the case of SAC Capital’s Mathew Martoma, who was
pursued by both the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office; “the SEC shared every document it
obtained through civil discovery from SAC Capital with prosecutors,” and “SEC attorneys and
SDNY prosecutors also jointly conducted twenty interviews of a dozen witnesses”). For
example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act “marked the first time that
Congress granted th[e] broad [administrative] investigative subpoena power solely for
criminal law enforcement purposes.” Berkower, supra note 90, at 2265, 2286–87 (citing a
delegation to the Attorney General in 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(B)(i)). As of 2005, the Attorney
General had delegated this power only to assistant U.S. attorneys and the Criminal Division,
not the Federal Bureau of Investigation, allowing them to perform a gatekeeping function. Id.
390. Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129,
1137 (2016).
391. Lachance v. Erikson, 522 U.S. 262, 268 (1998).
392. Persaud, supra note 240, at 89–90.
393. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
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against the CEO and ultimately caused the company to be dissolved and jobs to be
lost while competitors continued to conduct business unabated.394
Even short of existential threats, zealous investigations can unduly vex regulated
parties. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) conceded in 2013 to screening
organizations’ applications for tax-exempt status for politically loaded terms.395 The
IRS’s exempt organizations office would search for conservative-associated terms
like “Tea Party,” “patriots,” or “9/12,” and progressive-leaning terms like
“progressive,” “occupy,” and “green energy.”396 The agency would then subject such
groups to heightened scrutiny and request additional information from them.397
Targets of agency investigations may not have the resources to defend against
investigations or subsequent multi-year enforcement actions, and instead enter into
judicially unreviewable consent decrees. All of these consequences of unsound
investigative action can be exacerbated by “regulatory overlap.”398 A regulatory
breach might carry both civil administrative and criminal consequences and an
agency might partner with the Department of Justice to investigate.399 This
collaboration could be ripe for abuse and undermine public faith in both the rule of
law and law enforcement. For example, an administrative sanction can serve as a
pretext for a criminal investigation, theoretically allowing the agency and
prosecutors to take advantage of the lower constitutional standard for administrative
subpoenas versus criminal warrants.
Scholars have identified agency over-regulation in the setting of rulemaking (and
agency investigations preceding rulemaking).400 In the aggregate, regulatory overlap
creates redundancy, which increases the cumulative cost of agency action and thus,
presumably, the antecedent agency investigations.401 The same overlap concerns
should hold true for agency investigations preceding enforcement or adjudication.
That setting faces an additional problem: “multiple potential enforcers who

394. Josh Hicks, Federal Regulators Suing Buckyballs Founder in Rare Product-Recall
Case, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
federal_government/federal-regulators-suing-buckyballs-founder-in-rare-product-recallcase/2014/01/05/5b8c19ec-5087-11e3-a7f0-b790929232e1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4LPM-TRP8].
395. Brendan O’Brien, Justice Department Settles with Conservative Groups over IRS
Scrutiny, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2017, 8:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taxconservative/justice-department-settles-with-conservative-groups-over-irs-scrutinyidUSKBN1CV1TY [https://perma.cc/PVW5-MQVL].
396. Id.; Alan Rappeport, In Targeting Political Groups, I.R.S. Crossed Party Lines, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/politics/irs-targeting-teaparty-liberals-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/A4A3-5DCH].
397. O’Brien, supra note 395.
398. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138–51 (2012).
399. O’Rourke, supra note 389.
400. See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem
of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) (examining the
problem of regulatory accretion, whereby the administrative state has grown to encompass a
massive number of rules).
401. Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 897 (2006).
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undoubtedly already have jurisdiction over an issue might have incentives to show
enforcement zeal, even if duplicating others’ efforts.”402
Conversely, regulatory overlap could actually incentivize under-regulation, which
is also known as the “regulatory commons” effect.403 Under this theory, overlapping
agency jurisdiction can actually stymie agency action (and agency investigations),404
assuming that one agency has not naturally become the prime or traditional regulator
of an issue despite others’ potential authority.405 There may even be some advantages
to regulatory overlap and administrative crossfire, such as overcoming regulatory
inertia, breaking down jurisdictional barriers, and spurring regulatory innovation.406
However, these doctrines should be viewed in consideration of modern Congresses,
which have been riven with legislative torpor.407
Regulated parties’ reputations may be at stake because agencies are inconsistent
with how they publicly address their investigative work.408 Some have called out, for
example, the FTC’s “practices of ‘issuing news releases and the adverse effects
resulting therefrom,’” to which the D.C. Circuit and Congress “had essentially
acquiesced.”409 Often, the reputational risk is built into the statute. If the Securities
and Exchange Commission censures a business association, that entity can face
additional disclosure requirements, ineligibility to obtain federal contracts, and the
possibility of criminal proceedings, civil securities class actions, or shareholder
derivative actions.410 Additionally, when persons affiliated with the business
association (such as customers, vendors, moneylenders, shareholders, and

402. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 n.81 (2003).
403. Id. at 22, 27.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 29 n.81.
406. Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 329, 334 (citing Ahdieh, supra note 401, at 882–83).
407. See Drew DeSilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws
than Before, but Not More Substance, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115thcongress/ [https://perma.cc/V63P-K7WY]; Mark Murray, Unproductive Congress: How
Stalemates Became the Norm in Washington DC, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2013, 5:25 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/unproductive-congress-how-stalemates-becamenorm-washington-dc-flna6c10495877 [https://perma.cc/7E46-BAQP]; Michael Ellement, The
Supreme Court Meets a Gridlocked Congress, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 116 (2016).
408. Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1394, 1429 (contrasting the guidelines of the Consumer Products
Safety Commission with those of the FTC).
409. Id. at 1386; see Commission Closing Letters, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters-and-other-publicstatements/commission-closing-letters [https://perma.cc/A6S7-LK7T] (listing the FTC’s
letters announcing the close of investigations).
410. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AVOIDING AND RESPONDING TO MISCONDUCT § 14.06.
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employees) are contacted by the SEC, rumors can take root.411 The mere initiation of
the investigation may be as damaging as a guilty verdict.412
Agency investigations, even when appropriate, carry significant economic costs
on the public fisc and on targets. Taxpayers bear the brunt of most agency
investigative costs.413 For example, for fiscal year 2019, the FTC requested an
increase of $3,383,000 for “expert witness needs due to increased numbers of
complex investigations and litigation in both competition and consumer protection
matters.”414 The FTC requested a total appropriation of $309.7 million for fiscal year
2019.415 Under the now-lapsed Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and other
authorities, independent counsel investigations, too, can cost millions of dollars to
the independent counsel’s office and to the target defending against the charges.416
That said, some agencies return money to the Department of Treasury. To again use
the example of the FTC, the agency returns billions annually to Treasury.417 These
costs might not affect or incentivize any particular agency behavior, but they are
important to consider in appreciating the scope of investigative acts.
Responding parties, too, can incur sizable monetary costs to respond to an
investigation.418 For example, ignoring an Environmental Protection Agency
information request could cost up to $25,000 per day of noncompliance.419 Not only
can agencies engage in the above practices, but they may become comfortable doing
so. An agency might come into the agency investigation with—or develop over the
course of the investigation—outcome-determinative bias or preordination. An
agency has strong motives to do so in the absence of meaningful, systemic
countermeasures.

411. Lewis B. Merrifield III, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
32 BUS. LAW. 1583, 1594 (1977).
412. Id. Prosecutors may consider the collateral consequences of criminally prosecuting a
corporate entity, which include “the possibly substantial consequences to a corporation’s
employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom may, depending on the size
and nature of the corporation and their role in its operations, have played no role in the criminal
conduct, have been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent it . . . .” U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Just. Manual § 9-28.1100(B) (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principlesfederal-prosecution-business-organizations [https://perma.cc/D4U5-8V64].
413. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 369, at 435–36.
414. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2019-congressional-budgetjustification/ftc_congressional_budget_justification_fy_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JDB46C8E].
415. Id.
416. Hanly A. Ingram, United States v. Tucker: Should Independent Counsels Investigate
and Prosecute Ordinary Citizens?, 86 KY. L.J. 741, 768 (1997).
417. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 60 (Feb. 10,
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2021-congressional-budgetjustification/fy_2021_cbj_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WUK-6949].
418. United States v. Am. Target Advert., Inc., 257 F.3d 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2001).
419. United States v. Gurley, 384 F.3d 316, 319, 324 (6th Cir. 2004) (validating the
assessment of civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day for noncompliance per 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(e)(5)(B) and affirming the levy of a smaller amount against a defendant, $1.9 million
for seven years of willful noncompliance).
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Absent an admission from an agency decisionmaker or a judicial finding, one
might not be able to conclude that a particular agency is engaging in bad practices.
Agencies generally commence rulemaking procedures with an anticipated
outcome—if the agency does not think the rule was fundamentally viable, it would
not have started the rulemaking efforts.420 What a challenger might be able to show
is that the agency is cutting corners based on precedent, past behavior, or political
expediency.421 But it is very difficult to prove an unalterably closed mind.422 Even
when the Supreme Court held the Secretary of Commerce had improperly used
pretext to justify its asking of a new census question, it did not conclude that was
foreclosed from reconsidering.423
Another harm from improper agency investigations is more abstract:
constitutional horizontal separation of powers concerns. Many administrative
agencies operate in a zone that is free of oversight from both the policy prerogatives
of the First Branch and the oversight of the Third Branch, especially if the organic
statute provides no guidelines or Article III review of investigative practices. The
result, anecdotally and systemically, is the risk of tyrannical behavior by agencies
and within them, bureaucrats who are not politically accountable as principal or
inferior officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause.424 The concerns
expressed here about administrative investigations could echo beyond this context,
given the similarities between congressional investigations and administrative
investigations.425 Congress’s own investigative powers, including the issuance of
subpoenas,426 have raised concerns about Congress targeting executive branch
officials under the guise of a legislative investigation in order to avoid political
consequences.427
A key caveat must be reinforced in this assessment of the harms of overzealous
agency investigations: it is impossible to know the full extent of how agencies are
investigating. To the extent such information even could be aggregated, agencies
rarely report it publicly, such that one could readily research it. Agencies generally
do not report who and how they are investigating.428 Thus, not every agency will

420. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019); FTC v. Cement Inst.,
333 U.S. 683, 700–03 (1948).
421. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–66 (1954) (holding
that an agency must follow its own regulations).
422. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476, 487–88 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
423. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019).
424. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
443 (2018).
425. Epstein, supra note 111, at 41, 48.
426. See supra note 111.
427. Epstein, supra note 111, at 46 (“When Congress pursues oversight, then seeks to avoid
a political remedy by substituting the government target for a non-governmental one, it has
failed to effectively depoliticize its regulatory investigation.” (citing Trump v. Mazars USA,
LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 748 (2019) (Rao, J. dissenting))).
428. For instance, “[i]n general, the Department of Justice does not publicly announce
investigations or investigative findings.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., When Does the
Division Announce Investigations?, https://www.justice.gov/crt/when-does-divisionannounce-investigations [https://perma.cc/Q6BL-M2UH] (Oct. 18, 2018). The Department of
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announce the commencement of an investigation, detail an expansion of the
investigation’s scope, or issue close-out letters.429 Even when an agency provides a
“cold comfort letter” announcing that it harbors no present intentions to take
additional enforcement action against an entity, such letters are often not enforceable
and give no indication as to when an investigation might come back to life.430
This potential for the above abuse is real and has been occasionally recognized
since the rise of the administrative state. Over 70 years ago, Justice Murphy,
dissenting in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, noted with trepidation the
metastatic growth of the administrative state (which has only accelerated since he
wrote in 1946).431 He implored agency investigators to feel “a new and broader sense
of responsibility,” lest they succumb to the “open invitation to abuse” the immense
power of agency investigations and repeat the missteps of the pre-Revolution British
monarchy.432 “Only by confining the subpoena power exclusively to the judiciary,”
Justice Murphy opined, “can there be any insurance against this corrosion of
liberty.”433 While such an absolutist view raises the question of how agencies would
effectively carry out any enforcement authority if they had to petition a court for
subpoenas, this view reflects the longevity of concerns about agencies’ investigatory
powers.
The concurrences in the 1985 Heckler v. Chaney opinion expressed trepidation
that the majority opinion “empowered” agencies to administratively close
investigations. Justice Brennan, concurring, listed circumstances in which he
believed that, statutory language aside, non-enforcement decisions should be
reviewable.434 Justice Marshall’s separate concurrence went further, arguing that
district courts had invented remedies aimed at agencies to ensure “administrative
fidelity to congressional objectives.”435 In his view, the majority’s creation of a
“presumption of unreviewability” was an act of the Supreme Court failing to use “a
scalpel rather than a blunderbuss” to correct those remedies.436 Justice Marshall
posited that “[t]raditional principles of rationality and fair process do offer

Justice justifies its policy by citing the possibility that a premature announcement may impair
the Department’s ability to build a case, as well as the possible prejudice to the responding
party. Id. However, the Department may announce investigations when they result in
enforcement action or when law enforcement entities are involved. Id.
429. Some agencies do report certain statistics on investigations opened after the fact, for
example, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV.,
WORKLOAD STATS, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc
/M6WP-2UL2].
430. Fresenius Med. Care v. United States, 526 F.3d 372, 374–76 (8th Cir. 2008); Jonathan
Cone, Robert Rhoad & Robert Sneakenberg, Negotiating False Claims Act Settlements, 14-3
BRIEFING PAPERS 1, 10 (2014); see, e.g., Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order Authorizing,
but Not Directing, the Debtors’ Entry into the Settlement Agreement & Approving the
Settlement of the Qui Tam Claims and Related Matters, In re Trident Holding Co., No. 1910384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 29, 2019).
431. 327 U.S. 186, 218 (1950) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
432. Id. at 218–19.
433. Id. at 219.
434. 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J. concurring) (internal citations omitted).
435. Id. at 852 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment only).
436. Id.
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‘meaningful standards’ and ‘law to apply’ to an agency’s decision not to act, and no
presumption of unreviewability should be allowed to trump these principles.”437
Justice Marshall’s points may gain greater force when read in light of one of the
majority’s key justifications and considering how that justification has aged. The
majority concluded that agency exercises of administrative civil prosecutorial
discretion are presumptively non-reviewable, as “[a]n agency generally cannot act
against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”438 As
showcased above, the empirical predicate of Heckler may be eroding, especially in
light of the possibility of technology-facilitated total enforcement. At minimum, it is
a clear expression of the Court justifying its holding based on an agency’s limited
ability to enforce at high volumes, which implies a similar limitation on its ability to
investigate.
The above harms are all the more important to study given the potential for
disruptive new technologies to increase agencies’ abilities to investigate. The
deployment of machine learning439 and other artificial-intelligence-based
technologies that are already pervasive in the criminal justice system440 have begun
to change the Administrative State. Researchers recently applied machine learning
to analyze existing satellite data to identify previously unknown industrial animal
farms in North Carolina for Clean Water Act enforcement.441 This transaction
evidences how transformative, scalable, and affordable artificial intelligence can be
for administrative investigative practices.442 By replicating and improving upon
human cognitive and personnel capability, artificial intelligence harkens the
possibility of a total enforcement environment where many more regulatory
violations could be brought to account.443 In light of this exercise of administrative
power, it is necessary to consider the limiting principles that are in place to guide

437. Id. at 854.
438. Id. at 831 (majority opinion).
439. “Machine learning” is a type of artificial intelligence that uses algorithms to construct
computer models that analyze large data sets, typically to predict the future. See Federal
Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(A) (“The term ‘data
mining’ means a program involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses of 1 or
more electronic databases . . . to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative
of terrorist or criminal activity . . . .”).
440. Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277,
1293 (2018).
441. Laura Poppick, Environment Watchdogs Harness AI to Track Overflowing FactoryFarm Waste, SCI. AM. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
environment-watchdogs-harness-ai-to-track-overflowing-factory-farm-waste/
[https://perma.cc/35BM-MHYQ].
442. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014) (“In the
last few decades, researchers have successfully used machine learning to automate a variety
of sophisticated tasks that were previously presumed to require human cognition.”). These
tasks include language translation, vehicle driving, revealing bank fraud, calculating credit
risk, and so forth.
443. The seminal case that rendered administrative prosecutorial discretion presumptively
unreviewable was undergirded by an assumption that “agency generally cannot act against
each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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agencies in the increasingly likely hypothetical scenario in which one decides to run
an inspection-enforcement program that involves mailing packages full of machinesight-enabled drones to map, examine, and inspect a warehouse and every product
running in an assembly line, and then transmit the data on a 5G wireless network to
a government supercomputer that is running a deep learning444 algorithm to test the
possible violation of numerous statutes and regulations.
In sum, while investigative acts are necessary to agencies fulfilling their
constitutional and statutory duties, they also open the door to unaccountable abuse.
V. APPLYING MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINTS TO AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS
As this Article has demonstrated, there is no currently applied meaningful
constraint to investigative acts violating the Constitution or statutes. Professor Davis
observed seventy-three years ago that “[n]arrow judicial interpretations have given
rise to strikingly large grants of power.”445 His observation remains correct today. As
applied by the courts, the APA does not provide for meaningful or timely judicial
review to challenge agency subpoenas or other process due to the “authorized by
law” substantive standard. While that phrase is textually capacious, courts have
construed it narrowly. The marginally less deferential § 706(2) judicial review
provision of the APA, which assesses whether an agency act is “arbitrary or
capricious,” is hamstrung by the requirement that the tool be “final agency action.”
Since 1950, the Supreme Court has given little effect to many of the individual
liberty provisions of the Constitution, which are incorporated by the APA’s
“authorized by law” standard.446 The standards that apply to agency subpoenas,
warrants, or other investigative techniques need only meet minimal thresholds such
as not being “unduly burdensome” or being “reasonably relevant.” Regulated entities
should recognize and use other tools to shed light on the murky area of agency
investigations.
First, individuals and entities should make more robust use of existing judicial
constraints and push courts to expand the boundaries of judicial review.447 This is not
an easy task, given courts’ tendencies to uphold investigative acts under the thinking
that “[j]udicial supervision of agency decisions to investigate might hopelessly
entangle the courts in areas that would prove to be unmanageable and would certainly
throw great amounts of sand into the gears of the administrative process.”448
The greatest potential source of assistance for helping guard against abusive
agency investigations may be the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court, upon
being confronted with the issue, should revisit the current state of the law by more

444. Deep learning is a term for a strand of AI processes by which a computer program
refines its own internal models to improve its ability to process a set of information. Yann
LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436 (2015).
445. Davis, supra note 13, at 1117.
446. See supra Part IV.A.
447. Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129,
1162 (2016) (describing advantages of judicial review of agency enforcement practices).
448. SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 127 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc) (quoting Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1235 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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closely reviewing agencies’ interpretations of their investigations and investigative
acts.449
To accomplish that, courts could create a better remedy for an overbroad,
burdensome, or ultra vires subpoena or warrant. The current review regime is almost
unassailably deferential to the agency, offers a remedy of simply having the agency
limit the scope of the subpoena, and makes the respondent wait until the
commencement and termination of agency adjudication to be able to challenge the
agency, at which point the challenge can be practically, if not legally, moot. Courts
can simply grant declaratory relief to plaintiffs with limiting instructions. More
careful Fourth Amendment scrutiny would deter the agency from being overbroad or
needlessly intrusive from the start, especially given the disincentives responding
parties face to contesting such improper investigative acts.450 Litigants and judges
should also pay very close attention to the agencies’ enabling statutes and ensure that
agency investigative powers are authorized by the statute. More modern views of
statutory interpretation techniques since Oklahoma Press Publishing and Morton
Salt could lead courts to arrive at new conclusions about what, precisely, Congress
has actually authorized an agency to do with regard to an individual or entity it is
investigating. Relatedly, a challenger might seek reexamination of a 1947 Supreme
Court decision that absent an explicit statutory prohibition, an agency head may
delegate down the chain of command to sign and issue subpoenas.451
The Supreme Court should balance the separated powers against the odd and
problematic state of administrative law, today. These constitutional arguments are
not wholly new. The Supreme Court endorsed them in pre–World War II cases, when
the Court was much more skeptical of agency investigatory techniques.452 A
resurgence of those cases’ reasoning would help rein in abusive investigations. One
part of that resurgence could perhaps be the resurrection of the Supreme Court’s
limitation of subpoenas to where “the sacrifice of privacy is necessary—those where
the investigations concern a specific breach of the law.”453 Litigants could also appeal
to the Court’s bygone concern of roving inquiries into regulated parties’ records and
conduct, which it previously deemed as “contrary to the first principles of justice.”454
Those barriers fell with Oklahoma Press Publishing in 1946,455 but they could be
restored. Such a view would dovetail with the recent, general judicial evolution
toward closer inspection of agency activity.456
Specifically, the Court should revisit Oklahoma Press Publishing and Morton
Salt, which discounted stare decisis to make the very deferential Fourth Amendment

449. Persaud, supra note 240, at 89–90.
450. See Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory
Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1686–88 (2019) (arguing for remedies to clean up
“regulatory slop,” such as fee-shifting provisions, injunctions, tailored instructions on remand,
and the contempt power).
451. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1947).
452. Scherb, supra note 152, at 1079.
453. Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908) (emphasis
added).
454. FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
455. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1.
456. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2440 (2019).
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case law that is in force today. The Court should apply a standard for quashing
agency subpoenas or warrants with fidelity to the requirement that only the organic
statute provides the agency authority to perform an investigative act. In so doing, the
Court should eschew constraints such as the limitation that investigative acts not be
performed in “bad faith,” which arguably reserves discretion for judges to be lax in
policing the use of investigative acts. The Court should consider setting probable
cause as the standard for issuing an administrative warrant, especially given the
potential for a civil investigation founded on an administrative warrant to morph into
a criminal investigation.457 Courts should also prohibit administratively obtained
investigative materials from being used against the producing party in a criminal case
unless such material could have been obtained in a criminal investigation under the
Fourth Amendment.
Further, the Fifth Amendment should be reinvigorated in this arena. Courts should
recognize a due process property and liberty interest to more robustly challenge an
administrative investigation that is onerous and abusive. This could be a corollary to
the current Fourth Amendment defense against unduly burdensome investigations.
This interest might protect, for example, parties from having to produce privileged
information to agencies.458
This constitutional landscape will be difficult to shape. Litigants may have greater
success with the APA, though the Court has been increasingly willing to robustly
review administrative authority as of late.459 The APA’s provisions for challenging
agency subpoenas, warrants, and other process, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) and (d), are very
rarely used, especially throughout the past few decades. Litigants could breathe new
life into these provisions and help develop case law regarding their meaning. These
provisions are textually not limited by the final-agency-action requirement, and so
could be used in lieu of, or in addition to, the more broadly available provision for
challenging agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Of course, this provision may not be as
helpful to affected parties as they may like, though, because the Fourth Amendment
already permits respondents to challenge subpoenas and warrants on the ground that
the agency lacks the authority to issue them.
Litigants may consider arguing for a more robust interpretation of § 555(c), which
states that investigative acts must be “authorized by law.”460 A more respondentfriendly interpretation of § 555(c) might accord with the APA House Judiciary
Committee Report, which stated that APA investigative acts not only had to fall
within the agency’s jurisdiction, but also had to respect, to the greatest reasonable
degree, personal privacy and industry.461 To avail itself of the House Judiciary
Committee Report language, a party does not have the benefit of case law—which
appears to have cited, but not applied, this language only once.462 But, such a party

457. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
458. See cases cited supra note 145.
459. Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 1 (“Administrative law today is marked by the legal equivalent of mortal combat, where
foundational principles are fiercely disputed and basic doctrines are offered up for
‘execution.’”).
460. 5 U.S.C. § 555(c).
461. H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 264 (1946).
462. See Pac. Westbound Conf. v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 n.10 (9th Cir. 1964);
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can point to the fact that the Supreme Court has cited the House Judiciary Committee
Report with approval, if not dispositive weight.463 This may be the only way to argue
that § 555(c) is a hook to challenge an investigation as coercive or an abusive use of
prosecutorial discretion, which we believe is a reason to curb an agency
investigation.
An affected party could argue that a broad agency investigation impermissibly
blurs the separation of powers and is thus not authorized by law. A court could quash
the investigatory tool on that basis. This aligns with a recent opinion authored by a
Justice in the space of non-delegation doctrine, where administrative law impacts on
significant national issues tie, arguably fatally, into broader separation of powers
considerations.464
One semi-efficacious mechanism for entertaining § 555(d) challenges could be
the judicial imposition of a “clear statement” requirement as a canon of construction.
That is, a statute should have to clearly and expressly provide the agency with
particular investigatory powers—a general delegation of authority for rulemaking or
adjudication would not suffice. On the aggregate, this approach would benefit
privacy and private interests as courts fail to find investigative authority in vague or
empty legislative delegations and as Congress’s likely inertia or inaction fails to
respond.
A “clear statement” requirement would shift the burden from the respondent to
the agency. This approach would be consistent with other “clear statement” canons
the Court has imposed to protect constitutional values, for example the presumption
against retroactivity465 or the presumption in favor of judicial review.466 Requiring
such a canon here would be compatible with these more recent cases and present an
avenue to develop the law in a way that does not squarely challenge stare decisis.467
Finally, a statement would heed the Attorney General Committee’s warning from
almost eighty years ago that the power to procure information “should not be
withheld” from administrative agencies when needed, “but it should be exercised
with restraint and with knowledge that the burden imposed is a mounting one.”468
A court’s careful survey of the text and legislative history of the agency’s enabling
statute would help ensure that Congress in fact intended to give the agency the power
of investigation. Affected parties should also try to make more of § 706 challenges.
They could advocate for styling an administrative investigation as adjudication

Davis, supra note 13, at 1134; ASIMOW, supra note 8, at 47 (“[Section 555(c)] seems to add
nothing to existing law.”); see also FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1924).
463. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1680 (2019); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2436
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
464. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari).
465. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
466. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905–06 (2020).
467. This approach would also vindicate Justice Marshall’s concerns in his Heckler v.
Chaney concurrence about ensuring “administrative fidelity to congressional objectives.” 470
U.S. 821, 852 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment only).
468. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 47,
at 114.
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(either categorically or on a case-by-case basis). Then, certain requests, such as a
massive document search, could be classified as a final agency action, especially in
the context of adverse consequences for noncompliance. The Supreme Court might
also conclude that agency investigations as we have defined them—with the
elements of coercion and affirmative steps—are APA final agency actions.
That may be difficult in terms of the current § 704 finality case law from the
Supreme Court and circuit courts. But as noted earlier, recent Supreme Court
decisions have softened § 704’s final action barrier as a response to this problem,
including by viewing some closing letters as final agency action.469 A closing letter
is different from a decision to initiate an investigation. As the Sixth Circuit has held,
Hawkes may be distinguishable; if the agency’s report or determination had legal
consequences, such as prohibiting the agency from bringing enforcement
proceedings or denying the respondent legal safe harbor, then it is a final agency
action.470 But if further decision-making is available, then it may not be final agency
action.471
The extrastatutory “exceptional circumstances” exception to finality might also
yield helpful new constraints on agency investigations. Specific investigatory tactics
might also be final agency action.472 Individuals should keep an eye out for when
investigatory patterns emerge such that the policy or practice could itself be
challenged under the APA on an as-applied basis to the individual and for failure to
comply with rulemaking strictures. For example, an AI-assisted forensic review of
an entire database might be such a concrete and widespread act by an agency as to
constitute a substantive rule, for which notice-and-comment rulemaking is required
and judicial review is available.473
Second, individuals and entities should avail themselves of the political process.
An agency investigation presumably ought to be typically centered around some
discrete body of individuals. The more individuals targeted by an agency, the more
effectively those individuals have access to political machinery to resolve an issue.
The Internal Revenue Service scandal involving the targeting of political-sounding
groups seeking tax-exempt status riled enough groups and representatives that the
agency settled a lawsuit and apologized, and its commissioner resigned.474 But our
concern with the absence of countermajoritarian protections is the rights of the
individual or near-individual.

469. See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012) (holding that EPA compliance orders
are final agency action).
470. Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 878 F.3d 162, 170–71 (6th Cir. 2017).
471. Id.
472. See Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Normally, the
plaintiff must await resolution of the agency’s inquiry and challenge the final agency
decision.”).
473. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1 (chronicling the sometimes hazy line
between adjudications and rules, but noting that being addressed to unnamed classes of
individuals not presently before the agency is a hallmark of rules).
474. Jonathan Weisman, I.R.S. Chief Out After Protest Over Scrutiny of Groups, N.Y.
TIMES (May 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/us/irs-says-counsel-didnt-telltreasury-of-tea-party-scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/EGX5-CK9A].
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Third, Congress should consider legislative fixes. We recognize the political
reality that prospective legislation of this sort presents for actual passage into law is
a major challenge. The impetus for this might be analogous to when Congress let the
independent counsel statute475 lapse. The history suggests that the law’s critics, from
both parties, complained that the independent counsel wasted taxpayer money while
pursuing offenses short of “high crimes and misdemeanors” and trampling on
individual rights.476 Then-Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., appears to
have testified that a continuation of the special counsel statute was unnecessary, as
the Department of Justice can investigate most crimes itself.477 Thus, Congress would
need to free itself of this thinking if it were to consider that agencies might not, in
fact, be the best guards of their own investigatory behavior.
Specifically, Congress could go beyond the minimum requirements of Fourth
Amendment or other constitutional provisions. Congress could enshrine substantive
objections or new procedural vehicles into the APA. Recent Congresses considered
a bipartisan bill, the Email Privacy Act, which would have updated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 to require agencies to first obtain a judicial
warrant before subpoenaing internet service providers for information about
individuals’ activity on the internet.478 The Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) could also be a model. In December 2016, the Adjudication
Committee of ACUS recommended new procedures for evidentiary hearings not
required by the APA that are presided over by administrative law judges.479 Of note,
ACUS recommended that:
• Agencies should separate their internal functions. The personnel who
investigate, prosecute, and advocate should not also serve an adjudicatory
function.480
• Agencies should engage in discovery with rules closer to those contained
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including an agency showing of
need and cost justification.481 (We add that requiring the agencies to
adhere to “proportionality,” as used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

475. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (1994) (expired 1999).
476. David Stout & David Johnston, Justice Officials to Call for End to Counsel Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/02/us/justice-officials-to-call-forend-to-counsel-law.html [https://perma.cc/S2PJ-SWYV].
477. Id.
478. See Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 79 n.8 (2019) (listing
past unsuccessful attempts to pass this bill); Mark Tapscott, Congress to Protect Worst
Bureaucratic Outrage You’ve Never Heard About, DAILY CALLER (Dec. 4, 2015, 12:44 AM),
https://dailycaller.com/2015/12/04/congress-set-to-limit-judge-less-subpoenas-at-heart-ofprivacy-debate/ [https://perma.cc/9S3X-W2JZ] (describing the changes the bill would bring).
479. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., ADMIN. CONF. RECOMMENDATION 2016-4, EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS NOT REQUIRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (2016),
https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/evidentiary-hearings-not-required-administrativeprocedure-act [https://perma.cc/P6T3-XJ6Q].
480. Id. at 4.
481. Id. at 6.
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26(b),482 could help properly focus their investigative acts, particularly
where the information sought may be primarily electronically stored.)
Agencies with subpoena or other process power fully detail their subpoena
practice.483
Agencies should develop rules of evidence.484
Agencies should provide written or transcribable decisions, and decisions
should be made precedential.485

ACUS’s recommendations appear to be sound support, or are at least good
templates, for the sort of reform that Congress should consider to increase
transparency in the civil administrative investigation process.
The First Branch could amend agencies’ organic statutes to clarify or limit their
investigatory authorities to ensure they are in compliance with congressional intent
and are well-proportioned to the agency’s mission. Congress could refocus agency
priorities by explicitly separating compensation and advancement metrics from
violation-centered outcomes. That is, agency employees or the agency as a whole
should not receive incentives for pursuing investigations that result in enforcement
actions. Congress should consider limiting an agency’s ability to initiate additional
investigations after commencing adjudication, to prevent the pressure of additional
investigations from coercing settlement or acquiescence.
Relatedly, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which provides for attorneys’
fees to certain prevailing private parties in “civil actions” against the federal
government, could be amended.486 The APA has a similar provision for prevailing
parties in adversary adjudications.487 These provisions could explicitly apply to
§ 555(d) challenges of agency investigatory tools. Congress could expand EAJA
accessibility for attorney’s costs and fees associated with pre-litigation investigations
and enforcement actions.488
Congress could also reform the oversight process; if regulated entities are not able
to hold overzealous investigating agencies accountable, then other government actors
should be able to. The Department of Justice has commended judicial review of
administrative subpoenas, saying, “judicial involvement in enforcement ensures a
good degree of fairness.”489 Funding more inspectors general or expanding their
powers might positively impact the oversight process.490 Congress could also require
agencies to report more data on investigations they have begun, including the steps

482. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
483. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 479, at 6.
484. Id. at 8.
485. Id. at 9.
486. 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
487. 5 U.S.C. § 504.
488. The latest edition of the EAJA model rules by ACUS, for what it is worth, do not
include any sort of expansion. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 479.
489. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF LEGAL. POL’Y, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES,
PURSUANT TO P.L. 106-544, SECTION 7 (2002), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#4 [https://perma.cc/98JE-C8DB].
490. Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 299.
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undertaken in pursuit of the investigation and the eventual result of the investigation.
Even if that information is not made public, simply having this information would
better enable Congress—and agency heads—to determine whether agency
investigators are acting in accordance with the Constitution, the organic statute, and
principles of good governance.
Finally, agencies themselves could self-regulate and impose durable constraints
on themselves through the rulemaking process.491 Regulations defining the scope of
an agency’s investigation and creating procedural opportunities for responding
parties to contest an investigation’s scope or methods are not unheard of. For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has a regulation providing that
“[p]ersons who become involved in . . . [SEC] investigations may . . . submit a written
statement to the Commission setting forth their interests and position in regard to the
subject matter of the investigation.”492
Of course, an agency would seem to have little incentive to voluntarily make rules
reining in its investigative authority. This is especially so given the costs to the
agency of even making the rule. However, there is historical precedent; agencies,
especially before the APA was enacted, not infrequently developed standards of
conduct which they committed to follow.493 Even if an agency does not want to selfregulate, respondents have at least two possible routes to pressure the agency to do
so: (1) Respondents could submit comments urging the adopting of self-scoping rules
when the agency is considering related rules, and (2) Respondents could petition the
agency to make these rules under the APA’s petition procedure.494 This would help
craft new equipment with which to detect and study the unknown nuances of
administrative investigations.
CONCLUSION
The field of administrative investigations is broad and under-researched. This
Article endeavors to identify and to establish a framework to explore the space with
the knowledge that its depths lie unknown. We have concluded that each branch of
federal government that has enabled administrative investigations to flourish
unbounded can take discrete steps to bring them back into constitutional alignment.
Given the abuses agencies have engaged in and the potential for new technologies
to expand how investigations proceed, it is important that such controls be
implemented in the near future. Congress, with its plenary primacy on the policy and
powers of the administrative state, ought to take first chair to reform the
Administrative Procedure Act. Congress should establish positive procedures that
investigating agencies must follow and explicitly create a cause of action for
individuals and entities of the regulated public to access the courts for inappropriate
exercise of administrative investigative power. The executive branch should
establish durable controls of self-restraint so that the American people are treated
fairly when agencies act under Article II to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully

491. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9. 2019); Exec. Order
No. 13,892, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,239 (Oct. 9, 2019).
492. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2008).
493. Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 1409–10.
494. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
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executed.”495 The Judiciary should remedy its errors in United States v. Morton Salt
Co.496 and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling497 to enforce normative
constitutional constraints on administrative behavior. It should reassess the
procedural and substantive protections of the APA in line with its legislative history.
Lastly, the American public should be more cognizant of their lack of rights in
the face of administrative investigative power and take steps politically and legally
to press for their restoration, especially in the face of unchecked investigations like
those against LabMD. It is likely that the march of technology and the application of
cutting-edge artificial intelligence strands like machine learning and deep learning to
administrative investigations will serve as a catalyst for these actions. Until then,
Americans will slowly lose more of their rights.

495. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
496. 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
497. 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989).

